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of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use:
Knowledge Is the Best Medicine
Michelle D. Miller, R.N., M.P.H.*
Introduction
Consider the following medical experiments: "live cancer cells" injected
into twenty-two chronically ill patients without their knowledge,1 prison
inmates' testicles irradiated without their consent,2 hospitalized patients
injected with plutonium without their knowledge, 3 and 400 people with
syphilis "treated" with placebos for decades so that the United States Public
Health Service could trace the natural course of the disease.4 These human
rights abuses did not occur in Nazi Germany. Rather they occurred in the
United States, in many cases in contravention of the Nuremberg Code,
which was created by an American tribunal in the aftermath of World War
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 1997; Note Editor, Cornell International Law
Journal; M.P.H., Yale University, 1994; B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1988.
1. Robert D. Mulford, Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99,
99 (1967). This became known as the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital experiment. Id.
2. ADVISORY COMMiTTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT 3 (1995).
The Atomic Energy Commission funded this research on prison inmates in Washington
and Oregon to gain information to be used in government programs. Id.
3. Id. at 2. University scientists in Berkeley, California, Chicago, Illinois, and Roch-
ester, New York, conducted the experiments at the direction of the federal government.
The government expected the data to provide information on how to limit the dangers
faced by workers building the atomic bomb. Id.
4. JAMES H. JoNEs, BAD BLOOD 1-2, 5 (1993). The United States Public Health Ser-
vice (PHS) started the study in 1932 in Macon County, Alabama, to learn more about
the natural course of syphilis. The subjects, all black men, were never told that they had
syphilis. The doctors only said that they were being treated for "bad blood." In reality,
these men were never treated for syphilis. They were given inducements, such as a free
physical exam, free treatment for minor ailments, and a burial stipend for their survi-
vors, to continue to allow the PHS doctors to draw their blood periodically. As of 1969,
at least 28, and as many as 100, of these men had died as a direct result of syphilis, a
disease treatable with antibiotics since the 1940s. Id. at 1-6.
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11 to delineate ethical requirements for medical experimentation.5
The Nuremberg Code is that part of the judgment against twenty Nazi
doctors and three Nazi medical administrators (the Doctors' Trial)6 which
details the legal requirements of permissible medical experimentation. 7
The judges emphasized the importance of informed consent8 in human-
subjects research, describing it as "absolutely essential."9 Given this
explicit declaration that informed consent is necessary, how is it possible
that the aforementioned experiments could take place in the United States?
Perhaps such experimentation could occur because the idea that the indi-
vidual possesses the right to make all decisions relating to what is done to
her body has traditionally been subordinated by the medical profession to
the notion that the power to make all treatment decisions rests with the
physician. 10 Yet informed consent to medical experimentation and treat-
ment is necessary to uphold the ideal of self-determination, a principle at
the very foundation of American society."
One area of medical research that requires the use of humans as test
subjects is pharmaceuticals research. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), a department of the Public Health Service located within the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), regulates the pharma-
ceutical industry. The FDA requires research on human subjects as a pre-
requisite to drug approval in an effort to avoid placing potentially harmful
5. See generally THE NAZI DocTORs AND THE NUREMBERG CODE (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE NAZI DocTORs].
6. GeorgeJ. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Introduction, in THE NAZI Docro s, supra
note 5, at 3, 4. Although the War Crimes Tribunal was multinational, the United States
was responsible for the Doctors' Trial. I TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNcn. LAW No. 10, at 8 (1950) (Military Tribunal
Case 1, United States v. Karl Brandt et al.). The judges sitting at the Doctors' Trial were
appointed by President Truman. They were: Walter B. Beals (presiding), Justice of the
Supreme Court of Washington; Harold L. Sebring, Justice of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida; Johnson T. Crawford, former Justice of the Oklahoma District Court; and Victor C.
Swearingen (alternate member), former assistant attorney general of Michigan. THE NAZI
DocTORs, supra note 5, at 113 (photo caption).
7. Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 194
(1994) (stating that the "Code set the 'absolutely essential' prerequisite of a voluntary,
competent, informed, and comprehending consent for human experiment subjects"). In
his opening statements for the prosecution, Gen. Telford Taylor detailed examples of
experimentation on concentration camp inmates. Examples include: sterilization via
irradiation, submersion for hours in ice cold water, injection with malaria or typhus,
exposure to mustard gas, and the collection of skulls for racial comparisons. Telford
Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, December 9, 1946, in THE NAZI DocToRS,
supra note 5, at 67, 71-86. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
8. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services requires an investigator to
obtain "the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally
authorized representative.., under circumstances that provide the prospective subject
or the representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and
that minimize the possibility of concern or undue influence." 45 C.F.R. § 46.116
(1996). See infra note 50 for the specific required elements of informed consent.
9. THE NAZI DoctoRs, supra note 5, at 102.
10. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10J. CowrNMP. HEALTH
L. & PoL'Y 69, 73-74 (1994). It is only within the last 35 years that physicians have
become legally obligated to share decision-making with their patients. Id. at 72.
11. See infra note 313.
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products on the market.12 An interesting aspect of the FDA's work in this
area is the evaluation of clinical data from foreign countries. Historically,
the FDA has been reluctant to accept data from foreign countries as the
primary proof of drug efficacy and safety. 13 Thus, a domestic investigator
must replicate foreign experiment results. 14 The pharmaceutical industry
has criticized this duplication as being too expensive and of doubtful bene-
fit,15 while doctors and economists have complained that the practice
causes unnecessary delays in the availability of effective drugs.16
In an effort to address some of these problems, the FDA joined Japan
and the European Union (EU) in founding the International Conference on
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuti-
cals for Human Use (ICH) in 1989.17 The primary goal of the ICH is to
standardize the pharmaceutical development practices and procedures of
the three parties. 18 As part of this effort, the ICH is attempting to harmo-
nize the various protocols used by the participating countries to regulate
human-subjects research. To this end, the ICH has recently completed
draft guidelines for "Good Clinical Practice" (ICH-GCP), which include
requirements for informed consent in pharmaceuticals research. 19
This Note examines the definition of informed consent proposed by
the ICH. Given the vast cultural differences between the parties to the ICH
concerning the nature and importance of self-determination, is it possible
12. S. REP. No. 87-448, at 8 (1961).
13. Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After
1962, 32 PEasp. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 337 (1989). See infra note 263 and accompanying
text.
14. Jerome A. Halperin, From Investigation to Marketplace: Moving Drugs Through the
System, 36 FOOD DRUG Costa. LJ. 166, 169 (1981).
15. Mark A. Kassel, Note, Getting There First with the Best: The Need to Shorten the
Prescription Drug Approval Process, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 95, 123 (1992). Redundant repli-
cation of foreign data is wasteful. However, replicating a foreign study in such a way as
to discover new information, such as the drug's effect at different dose levels or on new
populations, would be extremely useful Louis Lasagna, On Reducing Waste in Foreign
Clinical Trials and Postregulation Experience, 40 CLINCAL PnHA coLoGY & THERA'EU-
Tcs 369, 369 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Barrett Scoville, Shifting the Burden: Restructuring the Drug Review Pro-
cess, 49 CLuicACL PHARMACOLOGY & THEauatmcs 229 (1991); GEN. AccouIrNG OFFICE,
FDA DRUG APPROVAL-A LENGTHY PRocEss THAT DELAYs THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT
Nev DRUGS, GAO REP. No. HRD-80-64 (1980); Wiumi M. WADEL & LOUiS LASAGNA,
REGULATION AND DRUG DEvELOPMENT 45-47 (1975).
17. Joseph G. Contrera, Comment, The Food and Drug Administration and the Inter-
national Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will International Pharmaceuti-
cal Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 927, 939-40 (1995). See infra Part II.
18. Stuart L. Nightingale, The International Harmonization of Drug Standards: The
Status of the International Conference on Harmonization Initiative 3 (Aug. 3, 1995) (on
file with the FDA) (Dr. Nightingale is the Associate Commissioner for Health Affairs at
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration). See infra Part II.A.
19. International Conference on Harmonization: Draft Guidelines on Good Clinical
Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,948 (1995) (proposed Aug. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Draft Guide-
lines]. "Good Clinical Practice (GCP) is an international ethical and scientific quality
standard for designing, conducting, recording, and reporting trials that involve the par-
ticipation of human subjects." Id. Each party to the ICH possesses its own Good
Clinical Practice guidelines. The ICH-GCP represents an attempt to standardize these
individual guidelines.
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or even desirable to standardize the disparate approaches to informed con-
sent in pharmaceuticals research? This Note asserts that the ICH process
fails to protect participants of pharmaceuticals research adequately.
Arguably, the political pressure on the FDA to streamline its drug approval
process threatens the safety of the people the FDA purports to safeguard.
In a rush to prove that it can respond effectively to criticism of its lengthy
drug approval process, the FDA may diminish U.S. informed consent stan-
dards in the name of harmonization. Alternatively, the FDA may be
tempted to overlook cultural differences in the role of informed consent on
human-subjects research for the sake of quickly achieving agreement.
However, an agreement which ignored the existence of these disparate
viewpoints would fall far short of actual harmonization. In that case,
although U.S. citizens will continue to be protected by rigorous informed-
consent standards, the United States will be accepting pharmaceuticals
research from nations that do not enforce strict standards of informed con-
sent. This position is potentially dangerous for U.S. citizens who purchase
foreign pharmaceuticals, as well as morally untenable for a nation dedi-
cated to respecting human rights.
Part I of the Note presents a brief survey of the tradition of informed
consent to medical research 20 in the United States, the European Union,
and Japan. Part II introduces the ICH, including a discussion of its goals
and processes. In addition, this Part explains the ICH structure as a form
of international regulatory negotiation. Part III.A. of the Note analyzes how
the regulatory negotiation used by the ICH may provide incentives for the
FDA to loosen its current informed-consent standards. Even if the FDA
does not diminish U.S. informed-consent standards, accepting research
data from countries which fail to protect subjects' rights to self-determina-
tion as vigilantly as the United States may still lead to negative conse-
quences. Therefore, Part III.B. focuses on the dangers inherent in ignoring
important cultural differences in the name of harmonization. Finally, Part
IV makes recommendations for protecting the subjects of pharmaceuticals
research within the context of harmonizing international pharmaceutical
development.
I. A Cultural Comparison of Informed Consent
A. Informed Consent in the United States
This section begins with a general discussion of informed consent in
biomedical research in the United States. Although pharmaceuticals
research belongs to this larger tradition, it implicates unique considera-
tions. Consequently, this section also specifically addresses this subset of
biomedical research.
20. This Note focuses primarily on informed consent to medical research rather
than to medical treatment. However, since experimental drugs are usually taken as part
of a treatment protocol there is often very little practical difference. See infra notes 38-43
and accompanying text.
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1. Informed Consent in Biomedical Research
Before World War 11, the American public was largely unaware of the legal
issues surrounding medical experimentation.2 1 The few cases addressing
the subject defined medical experimentation as a deviation from standard
medical practice that could only be justified by a positive outcome. 22 No
court raised the issue of requiring informed consent until the 1930s.2 3 In
that case, Fortner v. Koch, the Supreme Court of Michigan explained that
doctors could only perform human experimentation with the knowledge
and consent of the patient.24 The issue received relatively little attention
prior to World War 11, as only two other courts followed reasoning similar
to that of the Fortner court.2 5
The revelation of the experiments performed on concentration camp
inmates by Nazi physicians in the name of medical science dramatically
forced the issue of informed consent to the attention of Americans.2 6 In
the Doctors' Trial, the U.S. Military Tribunal No. 1 noted that medical
experimentation must remain within certain well-defined bounds in order
to comply with acceptable norms of medical ethics. 27 According to the
Tribunal, medical researchers must observe ten basic principles. These ten
principles became known as the Nuremberg Code.28 Given that the judg-
21. Maria Woltjen, Note, Regulation of Informed Consent to Human Experimentation,
17 Loy. U. CHi. UJ. 507, 509 (1986). The Nuremberg Doctors' Trial depiction of unethi-
cal Nazi experimentation on concentration camp inmates initiated the first widespread
public debate in the United States on the subject of human-subjects research. Id. at 510-
11.
22. GeorgeJ. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency, in
THE NAZI DocroRs, supra note 5, at 202 (citing Ownes v. McClearey, 281 S.W. 682, 685
(Mo. 1926)).
23. Former v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762 (Mich. 1935).
24. Id. at 765. The court recognized the importance of experimentation to medical
progress, but cautioned that medical experimentation should not vary greatly from
accepted medical practice. Id.
25. Stammer v. Board of Regents, 29 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1941), affd, 287 N.Y. 359 (1942)
(reversing the revocation of a physician's license after he experimented with a new
cream for facial cancer and noting that such experimentation is within the scope of a
doctor's practice as long as he obtains informed consent from his patient); Bonner v.
Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that a physician must obtain the
informed consent of a minor's parents where a 15-year-old boy underwent a skin graft to
benefit a cousin).
26. See supra note 7.
27. THE NAzi DocroRs, supra note 5, at 102.
28. Because it is part of a judgment by an American tribunal in an international
setting, the Nuremberg "Code is part of international common law and may be applied,
in both civil and criminal cases, by state, federal and municipal courts in the United
States." GEORGE J. ANNAs ET AL, INFoRMED CONSENT To HuMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE
SUBJEcr's DILEMMA 21 (1977). The Code is "[t]he most complete and authoritative state-
ment of the law of informed consent to human experimentation .... Id. at 1. The
Nuremberg Code is comprised of ten basic principles:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give con-
sent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowl-
edge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
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ment originated from a U.S. trial complete with U.S. judges, prosecutors,
and criminal procedure, 29 an objective observer might have expected that
U.S. courts would use the Nuremberg Code as the legal standard for medi-
cal experimentation. However, it was not until 1973, more than twenty-five
years later, that any court cited the Code.30 The delay may be partially
attributable to the extreme nature of the Nazi experiments31-no court
wanted to compare an American doctor to a Nazi physician. As Professor
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter ele-
ment requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the exper-
imental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be con-
ducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participa-
tion in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of
society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and
unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other
problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of
the experiment-
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical
and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted when there is an a priori reason to
believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those exper-
iments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the
humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to
protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disa-
bility, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified per-
sons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages
of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty
to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state
where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be pre-
pared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably cause to
believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment
required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in
injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
II TRIALs OF WAR CRiMiNALs BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LA v No. 10, at 181-82 (1950) (Military Tribunal Case 1, United States v. Karl
Brandt et al.) [hereinafter Nuremberg Code].
29. Annas, supra note 22, at 204.
30. Id. at 206, 220 n.21 (citing Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. Mental Health, Civil
No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., July 10, 1973)). The Kaimowitz court
used the Nuremberg Code for guidance in its holding that an involuntarily committed
mental patient could not legally consent to experimental psycho-surgery because he
lacked the requisite mental competence. Id.
31. Annas, supra note 22, at 204.
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Katz explained, "[ilt was a good code for barbarians but an unnecessary
code for ordinary physician-scientists." 32
In addition, the Nuremberg Code probably did not immediately
become part of recognized law because the Tribunal misunderstood the
content of standard medical practice relating to human-subjects research.
Although the judges believed that the "basic principles" of the Nuremberg
Code had long been accepted in Western medicine,33 in actuality the Amer-
ican Medical Association did not fashion guidelines for the conduct of
medical research until after the content of the Nazi concentration camp
experiments became clear.34 Ironically, the only Western nation which
had pronounced an authoritative guarantee of research subjects' rights
before the Nuremberg Code was Germany.35 This mistaken belief in the
existence of a worldwide consensus on acceptable medical research prac-
tice caused the Tribunal to label the Nazi experiments an aberration, rather
than just an extreme example from a long history of injuries inflicted on
people in the name of medical science.36 Following the Tribunal's lead,
American medical scientists avoided confronting their own questionable
conduct by characterizing the Nazi abuses as different in kind, not just in
degree.37
As a result, the American medical community adopted a framework
which distinguished between non-therapeutic experimentation, performed
solely to test a hypothesis (e.g. the Nazi experiments), and therapeutic
research, designed to help the subject patients as well as aid the scientist.38
The medical community characterized therapeutic research as a form of
32. Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and
Now, in THE NAzi DocroRs, supra note 5, at 228. The American belief that the Nazis
were not like Americans is partially responsible for the fact that U.S. courts have avoided
invoking the Nuremberg Code even when it is directly applicable. Annas, supra note 22,
at 218.
33. Katz, supra note 32, at 228. The testimony of two medical experts helped to
convince the judges that, although there had been no official statement incorporating
these basic principles, the medical community abided by them. In particular, the testi-
mony of Dr. Andrew Ivy asserted that the hippocratic oath served to establish guidelines
for the protection of patients. However, there is no mention in the oath about medical
research. Id.
34. Id. Currently, the American Medical Association directs physicians to obtain
"voluntary written consent" from any person participating in a clinical investigation
designed either for treatment purposes or for the accumulation of scientific knowledge.
Am. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF MEDIcAL ETHics: ANNOTATED CuRum-rr OPiNmONs § 2.07(3)(B)
(1992).
35. Katz, supra note 32, at 227. In 1931, the Reichminister of the Interior promul-
gated Regulations on New Therapy and Human Experimentation. Id. The American
Medical Association patterned its post-var guidelines on the ethics of human experi-
mentation after the earlier German pronouncements. I TRLus OF WAR CRMimNALs BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MiurARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL CouNciL LAw No. 10, at 82-86
(1950) (Military Tribunal Case 1, United States v. Karl Brandt et al.) (testimony of prose-
cution wimess Dr. Andrew C. Ivy).
36. Katz, supra note 32, at 228. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
37. Katz, supra note 32, at 228.
38. Annas, supra note 22, at 217-18.
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therapy, rather than experimentation.39 Therefore, by definition, the
Nuremberg Code did not apply to it. 40 This distinction is reflected in the
case law, as U.S. courts have only cited the Nuremberg Code in cases
addressing non-therapeutic research.4 1 Unfortunately, the line between
non-therapeutic research and therapeutic research is a formal distinction
lacking substantive support.4 2 A person's right to self-determination, and
therefore the need for informed consent, should not change with the label
attached to the bodily invasion, whatever its goal. 43
In the 1960s, reports of abuses of human subjects in American medi-
cal research caused great alarm.44 For example, in 1966, Henry K. Beecher
published an article revealing ethical violations in twenty-two reported
research studies.4 5 The American public demanded government action. 46
In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act which established the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
39. Id. at 217. As medical experimentation became more scientifically valid, it
moved into the medical mainstream and out of the realm of quackery. Id.
40. Id. at 218. Non-therapeutic medical experimentation came to be considered the
only real medical experimentation. Therefore, the Nuremberg Code applied only to it.
This distinction enables the medical and legal communities to ignore the necessity of a
strong informed-consent standard for all medical experimentation. For example, U.S.
soldiers have often been used unwittingly as research subjects to test the effects of such
substances as LSD and radiation. Id. One author points out that while we were horri-
fied to hear that a Nazi physician told a young colleague not to experiment on herself
because "[v]e have concentration camps for that," we seem to see no contradiction when
our military says, "[wle have soldiers for that." Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (holding that active-duty
U.S. Army servicemen could not sue the federal government for money damages for
injuries resulting from LSD administered experimentally by the Army without the sol-
dier's consent). The majority voiced a reluctance to interfere with military "discipline
and decision-making." Id. at 683. The dissent, noting the existence of the Nuremberg
Code, asserted that the decision amounted to giving military officials unqualified immu-
nity for intentional infliction of injury on service personnel. Id. at 708. This is the only
case in which the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to the Nuremberg Code.
42. See Szczygiel, supra note 7, at 194.
43. Cf. Katz, supra note 10, at 86 (arguing that individual self-determination should
always trump medical progress when the two goals are incompatible). Placing individ-
ual autonomy in the ascendant position insures that doctors always respect their
patients as people. Id. at 85. Until recently, the idea that individual patients must be
respected as autonomous moral decision makers was foreign to the medical profession.
Id. at 73.
44. John A. Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REv. 484,
486-87 (1979).
45. Henry K. Beecher, Ethics & Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1354 (1966).
For example, placebos were given to 109 military servicemen suffering from streptococ-
cal respiratory infections as a control group, while another group with the disease were
treated with Penicillin G. Id. at 1356. In another case, effective treatment for typhoid
fever, by administering Chloramphenicol, was withheld from 157 hospital charity
patients to determine the relapse rate without such treatment. Id. A third instance of
medical experimentation involved institutionalized mentally retarded children who were
purposely infected with infectious hepatitis to determine the infectivity of the virus. Id.
at 1358.
46. Woltjen, supra note 21, at 511.
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and Behavioral Research (the Commission).47 The National Research Act
directed the Commission to identify "the basic ethical principles which
should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involv-
ing human subjects."48
Based on the Commission's findings, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) (now the Depaftment of Health and Human
Services) established regulations for all human-subjects research con-
ducted or funded by the government.49 The regulations list eight require-
ments for valid informed consent.50 In addition, the regulations mandate
that HHS will refuse to award a federal research grant to an institution
unless an Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviews and approves the
research protocol. 5 ' IRBs are required to ascertain whether legally
informed consent has been obtained and whether the rights and welfare of
the subjects are adequately safeguarded.52 This policing function requires
IRBs to monitor all research conditions periodically throughout the course
of the project to ensure that no violations have occurred.5 3 The law per-
taining to human-subjects research is currently shaped by these regulatory
requirements.
47. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 348 (1974). See also
Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and Regulations,
in THE NAzi DocroRs, supra note 5, at 183, 187.
48. National Research Act of 1974, supra note 47, § 202(a)(1)(A).
49. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1996).
50. The eight elements are as follows:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes
of the research and the expanded duration of the subject's participation, a
description of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any proce-
dures which are experimental;
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the
subject;
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reason-
ably be expected from the research;
(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if
any, that might be advantageous to the subject;
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which the confidentiality of
records identifying the subject will be maintained;
(6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as to
whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether any medical treat-
ments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they consist of, or where
further information may be obtained;
(7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about
the research and research subjects' rights, and whom to contact in the event of a
research-related injury to the subject; and
(8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve
no penalty or no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise
entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any time without pen-
alty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.
45 C.F.R §§ 46.116(a)(1-8) (1996).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1996); 21 C.F.R. § 56.103(a) (1996). See also Glantz,
supra note 47, at 188 (discussing Institutional Review Board regulations).
52. Robertson, supra note 44, at 491.' The IRBs are mandated to ensure that research
subjects receive all information that the members of the IRB judge relevant to the sub-
jects' rights and welfare. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (1996).
53. Robertson, supra note 44, at 491.
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2. Informed Consent in Pharmaceuticals Research
Human experimentation is a very important aspect of pharmaceuticals
research. Until a drug is actually tested in human trials there is no way to
be sure of its efficacy, for products that work in the test tube and on other
animals do not always produce the desired results in the human body.5 4
Although pharmaceuticals research shares common medical and legal stan-
dards with other forms of human-subjects research, it has a unique history.
Until this century, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry was largely unregu-
lated; caveat emptor was the philosophy of the day.5 5 As a result, consum-
ers became de facto research subjects, as there was no legal requirement
that drugs be tested for safety or efficacy prior to reaching the market. 56
Many people were undoubtedly injured by ingesting poisons or narcotics
marketed as safe medicine. 57
At the beginning of this century, Congress attempted to ameliorate the
situation, but most of these efforts were either misguided, misdirected, or
simply ineffectual. In 1906, for example, the Pure Food and Drug Act
made misrepresentation of pharmaceutical content illegal. 58 A manufac-
turer was not required to disclose the contents of a product, but if it chose
to do so, the government could monitor the accuracy of the claims.5 9 In
addition, the label had to display the presence of any narcotic content to
the consumer. 60 The statute had limited effect. 6 1 In 1911, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the law prohibited only false claims regarding
ingredients, not false health claims.6 2 A year later, Congress attempted to
54. Cf. Kenneth L. Melmon et al., Principles of Therapeutics, in GOODMAN AND
Giu 's THE PHARMACOLOGIcAL BAsis OF THEAEurtcs 40, 43 (Alfred Goodman Gilman
et al. eds., 1980) (explaining the desirability for clinical trials in drug efficacy research).
55. Richard C. Litman & Donald S. Litman, Protection of the American Consumer:
The Muckrakers and the Enactment of the First Federal Food and Drug Law in the United
States, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 647, 647 (1981). Government regulation of
pharmaceuticals dates to the colonial period. For example, in 1630, Nicholas Knopf was
convicted of selling "a water of no worth or value" as a cure for scurvy. He was sen-
tenced to pay a fine or be whipped. Wallace F. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law:
How It Came; How It Works, 35 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 132, 132-33 (1980). Notwith-
standing this example of vigilance, legal action preventing the sale of nostrums (quack
medicines) was the exception, rather than the rule until the twentieth century. Id.
56. Id. at 133.
57. See Litman & Litman, supra note 55, at 652. In fact, because European countries
regulated drugs earlier than the United States, this country became a dumping ground
for unsafe and contaminated European drugs in the nineteenth century. Wallace F. Jans-
sen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. LJ.
420, 422 (1981).
58. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Catharine E. Bednar, A Constitutional Analysis of Federal Drug Marketing Reg-
ulations and Food and Drug Administration Implementation, 13 Sw. U. L. RE.. 531, 543-
46 (1983). For example, a newly named non-narcotic preparation, for which a producer
chose not to reveal the contents, fell completely outside the scope of the law. Id. at 543
n.72.
62. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 495 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (holding that
the defendant could not be prosecuted under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, even
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remedy the problem by passing the Sherley Amendment.63 The Amend-
ment prohibited fraudulent label claims about a drug's therapeutic effec-
tiveness.64 Unfortunately, the statute, as interpreted, required proof that
the drug manufacturer had deliberately lied in order to defraud the pub-
lic.65 Consequently, the statute had little, if any, practical effect.66
The Sulfanilamide67 Elixir catastrophe of 1937 moved Congress to
real action. In that year, at least 107 deaths resulted from the sale of an
untested new medicine to the public. 68 On the theory that children prefer
drugs in a liquid form, the manufacturer decided to dissolve it in a syrup.69
The manufacturer chose di-ethylene glycol, 70 a key ingredient in anti-
freeze.71 No one bothered to run any safety tests or even to research the
solvent in chemistry text books, and tragedy followed.72 In response, Con-
gress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 73 The statute dra-
matically expanded the enforcement power of the FDA. It required
companies to provide scientific proof of safety before a new product could
be marketed.74
Until 1959, the pharmaceutical industry enjoyed a cordial relationship
with Congress regarding economic and corporate issues.75 In that year,
Senator Estes Kefauver, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly, began hearings on monopolistic pricing practices of the
industry. 76 However, before the subcommittee reached a resolution, the
though he knew that his "Mild Combination Treatment for Cancer" would not produce
the health effects claimed, because he had made no false ingredient claims).
63. Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912) (amending the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906).
64. Id.
65. Janssen, supra note 57, at 428.
66. Id.
67. Sulfanilamide was used at the time to treat acute rheumatic fever and pneumo-
nia. MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PIUS, PROFRTS, & PoLrTcs 6 (1974).
68. Id. The human body metabolizes di-ethylene glycol into oxalic acid, leading to a
lingering, excruciatingly painful death from kidney failure. Many of the casualties were
children. Id.
69. Id. at 86.
70. Id. The choice of di-ethylene glycol appears to have been motivated by the drug's
poor solubility in normal solvents, such as water and alcohol. The manufacturer added
coloring and raspberry flavoring to complete the mixture. Id.
71. Arthur H. Hayes, Food and Drug Regulation After 75 Years, 246 JAMA 1223, 1224
(1981).
72. SILVERMAN & LEE, supra note 67.
73. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988)).
74. See id. § 505, 52 Stat. at 1052. In addition, the Act provided the FDA with spe-
cific authority to inspect pharmaceutical production plants, eliminated proof of fraud as
a requirement to enjoin false drug claims and authorized federal courts to restrain viola-
tions of the Act via injunction. Id. See also Janssen, supra note 57, at 429.
75. Lasagna, supra note 13, at 323-24.
76. Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The
Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure, 1982 Amz. ST. LJ. 581, 584 (1982). These hearings
covered the pricing practices of the steel, automobile, bread, and drug industries. S. REP.
No. 87-448, at 1 (1961). The investigation of the pharmaceutical industry alone
spanned 26 months and generated 12,885 pages of testimony. Lasagna, supra note 13,
at 324.
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Thalidomide tragedy struck Thalidomide is a sedative that had been mar-
keted as safe and effective in Europe in the late 1950s and early 1960s.7
7
In the United States, the drug was in the final stages of FDA-required test-
ing when obstetricians discovered its harmful side effects. As part of test-
ing, 3,897 pregnant women were given the sedative.78 Nine of those
women gave birth to children suffering from phocomelia, 79 a birth defect
which causes the infant's extremities to resemble the flippers of seals.80
Congress reacted by passing the Kefauver Drug Amendments Act of
1962.81 The Act required "experts using.., drugs for investigational pur-
poses" to inform anyone to whom they administered the drug of its experi-
mental nature and to obtain her consent, unless, in the expert's
professional judgment, such knowledge would be detrimental to her inter-
ests.8 2 Prior to this enactment, neither state nor federal law required doc-
tors to inform their patients that a prescribed drug was experimental.
3
Unfortunately, the statutory phrase, detrimental to the person's interests,
appears to have served as a loophole for researchers. Consequently, the
Act failed to achieve its major goal of requiring adequate informed
consent.
8 4
To cure this imperfection, the FDA promulgated specific informed-
consent regulations. 85 The current version of the FDA regulations requires
that a physician provide her patient with the following:8 6 1) an explana-
tion of the purpose of the research and notification that the procedure to
The hearings focused on economic concerns rather than drug safety. By 1958, the
pharmaceutical industry's annual budget was estimated at $140 million. While it
appears small when compared to today's expenditure of $6 to $7 billion per year, it was
considered large at the time. Lasagna, supra note 13, at 323.
77. SiLvERmAN & LEE, supra note 67, at 94. Thalidomide produces a "refreshing
sleep" without grogginess. It was widely given to "fretful infants." Physicians and phar-
macists thought the drug was free from side effects. Id.
78. Hayes, supra note 71, at 1224.
79. Id. In Europe, it was estimated that by 1962, 3,500 to 5,000 cases of phocomelia
would result from pregnant women's ingestion of Thalidomide. S. REP. No. 87-1744, at
40 (1962).
80. SiLV tmAN & LEE, supra note 67, at 95.
81. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-394 (West Supp. 1992)).
82. See id. § 103(b) 76 Stat. at 783 (amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, § 505(i), 52 Stat. at 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988)).
83. Glantz, supra note 47, at 186.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. § 50.20-50.27 (1996). These regula-
tions are similar to those promulgated by HHS for institutions receiving federal funds
for non-drug-related medical experimentation. See supra note 50. There are two impor-
tant differences between the sets of regulations. First, the FDA regulations require the
physician to inform the subject that the FDA may inspect her records. 21 C.F.R.
§ 50.25(a)(5) (1996). Second, the written informed-consent requirement may be waived
when the FDA determines that the research poses no more than a "minimal risk." 21
C.F.R. § 56.105 (1996). Minimal risk is defined as a risk not greater than that ordinarily
encountered in daily life, or during routine physical or psychological examinations. 21
C.F.R. § 56.102(i) (1996).
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be followed represents a departure from established practice;8 7 2) a
description of the risks and discomforts which may reasonably be
expected;88 3) a description of any benefits to the subject or to others
which may reasonably be expected;8 9 4) a statement describing the extent
to which confidentiality of the subject's records will be preserved; 90 5) a
statement of whether any alternative treatments exist;91 6) a description of
the availability of medical therapy or compensation in case injury results
from the experiment;92 7) an opportunity to ask questions concerning the
experiment;93 and 8) an assurance that the subject is free to refuse to par-
ticipate or to withdraw her consent and discontinue participation at any
time without penalty or loss of benefits to which she is otherwise
entitled. 94
After many decades of virtually ignoring the human rights issues
inherent in medical experimentation,95 the FDA regulations reflect a com-
mitment by the United States to protect those interests, at least at the fed-
eral level.96 The requirements for informed consent manifest that resolve.
All federally sponsored research must include a procedure to provide
potential subjects with sufficient information to determine for themselves
whether or not they will participate in the experiment. 97
B. Informed Consent in the European Union98
The Directive of the Commission of the European Communities addressing
analytical, pharmacotoxicological and clinical standards and protocols in
testing medicinal products, provides the most current expression of Good
87. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(1) (1996). Informed consent shall include identification of
any procedures which are experimental. Id.
88. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2) (1996).
89. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(3) (1996).
90. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(5) (1996).
91. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(4) (1996).
92. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6) (1996).
93. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(7) (1996).
94. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(8) (1996).
95. See supra notes 1-5, 45 and accompanying text.
96. Only three states, California, New York, and Virginia, have statutes specifically
addressing informed consent in the context of medical experimentation. In all three
states researchers must provide the following information in order to obtain legal
informed consent from their subjects: an explanation of the procedures, drugs, or
devices to be used in the experiment; a disclosure of alternatives; a description of poten-
tial risks and benefits; an offer to field any questions the subject may have; and the
instruction that the subject may voluntarily withdraw from the experiment at any time.
Both New York and Virginia require the creation of an Institutional Review Board for any
institution proposing to do research involving human subjects. See CAL. HEALTH &
SarTY CODE § 24172 (West 1984); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2441 (McKinney 1985); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.16 (Michie 1984); Woltjen, supra note 21, at 518-23.
97. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1996), supra note 49 and accompanying text.
98. The term European Union (EU) superseded European Community (EC) when the
Maastricht Treaty took effect in 1992. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 1, 1992, art. a,
31 I.L.M. 247, 255 (1992).
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Clinical Practice for the EU (EU-GCP). 99 The EU-GCP directive points the
reader to the current version of the Declaration of Helsinki' 0 0 for ethical
guidance concerning the completion of clinical trials.' 0 1 In addition, the
directive states, "[iln principle, the freely given informed consent of each
trial subject shall be obtained and documented." 10 2
The World Medical Assembly (WMA) adopted the Declaration of Hel-
sinki in 1964.103 The WMA Committee on Medical Ethics subsequently
revised the Declaration in 1975 and again in 1989.104 The Declaration is
comprised of twelve basic principles.' 0 5 Unlike the Nuremberg Code,
which began with an exhortation on the essential nature of informed con-
99. Commission Directive 91/507/EEC, 1991 OJ. (L 270) 32, 48 [hereinafter Com-
mission Directive]. This particular directive falls into the category of "[alcts whose pub-
lishing is not obligatory" for the member states. Id.
100. World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki IV (1989), reprinted in THE
NAzi DocToRs, supra note 5, at 339 [hereinafter Helsinki IV].
101. Commission Directive, supra note 99, at 48. A clinical trial is "[a] carefully
designed and executed investigation of the effects of a drug administered to human sub-
jects." TaBn's CYCLOPEDIC MEIC.AL DICTIoNARY 341 (15th ed. 1985).
102. Commission Directive, supra note 99, at 48.
103. Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in T-tE
NAZI DocTORs, supra note 5, at 149, 159. The WMA Committee on Medical Ethics first
submitted a resolution for a code of ethics regarding human experimentation to the
WMA's 15th General Assembly in September 1961. Id. The World Health Organization,
the branch of the United Nations responsible for directing international public health
initiatives of member nations, adopted the Helsinki Declaration in 1964. Katz, supra
note 32, at 233.
104. Helsinki IV, supra note 100.
105. The principles of the Helsinki Declaration are as follows:
1. Biomedical research involving human subjects must conform to generally
accepted scientific principles and should be based on adequately performed lab-
oratory and animal experimentation and on a thorough knowledge of the scien-
tific literature.
2. The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving
human subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which
should be transmitted for consideration, comment and guidance to a specially
appointed committee independent of the investigator and the sponsor provided
that this independent committee is in conformity with the laws and regulations
of the country in which the research experiment is performed.
3. Biomedical research involving human subjects should be conducted only by
scientifically qualified persons and under the supervision of a clinically compe-
tent medical person. The responsibility for the human subject must always rest
with a medically qualified person and never rest on the subject of the research,
even though the subject has given his or her consent.
4. Biomedical research involving human subjects cannot legitimately be car-
ried out unless the importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent
risk to the subject.
5. Every biomedical research project involving human subjects should be pre-
ceded by careful assessment of predictable risks in comparison with foreseeable
benefits to the subject or to others. Concern for the interests of the subject must
always prevail over the interests of science and society.
6. The right of the research subject to safeguard his or her integrity must
always be respected. Every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of
the subject and to minimize the impact of the study on the subject's physical and
mental integrity and on the personality of the subject.
7. Physicians should abstain from engaging in research projects involving
human subjects unless they are satisfied that the hazards involved are believed
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sent, the Declaration begins by stressing the importance of medical pro-
gress. In fact, the Declaration relegates informed consent to a numerically
subordinate position. Principle 9 asserts that "[i]n any research on human
beings, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims,
methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the study and the
discomfort it may entail .... The physician should then obtain the sub-
ject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing."10 6
While the drafters may not have intended the numerical order of the
principles to establish a hierarchy denoting importance, it is interesting to
note that the original draft of the Declaration opened with a statement
regarding the importance of informed consent in a section entitled "Gen-
eral Principles and Definitions."10 7 However, even that version qualified
its commitment to informed consent in the very next section, "Experiments
for the Benefit of the Patient."108 In that section, physicians were endowed
with great discretion to conduct therapeutic research without consent, so
long as the experiment was not performed for the sole purpose of acquir-
ing knowledge. 109 The grant of such potential power to physicians empha-
sizes the paternalistic notion that doctors know better than patients
whether the latter should participate in experimental treatment.
to be predictable. Physicians should cease any investigation if the hazards are
found to outweigh the potential benefits.
8. In publication of the results of his or her research, the physician is obliged
to preserve the accuracy of the results. Reports of experimentation not in
accordance with the principles laid down in this Declaration should not be
accepted for publication.
9. In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the
study and the discomfort it may entail. He or she should be informed that he or
she is at liberty to abstain from participation in the study and that he or she is
free to withdraw his or her consent to participation at any time. The physician
should then obtain the subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in
writing.
10. When obtaining informed consent for the research project the physician
should be particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent relationship to
him or her or may consent under duress. In that case the informed consent
should be obtained by a physician who is not engaged in the investigation and
who is completely independent of this official relationship.
11. In case of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained from
the legal guardian in accordance with national legislation. Where physical or
mental incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the
subject is a minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the
subject in accordance with national legislation.
Whenever the minor child is in fact able to give a consent, the minor's consent
must be obtained in addition to the consent of the minor's legal guardian.
12. The research protocol should always contain a statement of the ethical
considerations involved and should indicate that the principles enunciated in
the present Declaration are complied with.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Katz, supra note 32, at 233 (citing Ethical Committee of the World Medical Asso-
ciation, Draft Code of Ethics on Human Experimentation, 2 Barr. Mi. J. 1119 (1962)).
108. Id
109. Katz, supra note 32, at 233.
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Nevertheless the Declaration of Helsinki does require informed con-
sent. It appears, however, that the EU-GCP does not necessarily mandate
such consent. That document, while directing the reader to the Declara-
tion for ethical guidance, immediately diminishes the impact of that docu-
ment by modifying the informed consent requirement with the critical
phrase, "[i]n principle." 110 This qualification seems to indicate that the
acquisition of informed consent is not necessarily required in practice.
The English tradition highlights the differences between the EU and
the U.S. treatment of informed consent.1 1 1 Prior to the 1970s, the United
States utilized the professionally oriented standard of disclosure,1 12 which
determines what constitutes adequate informed consent by reference to
standard medical practice. 113 Thus, if a doctor has conformed to the
expected standard of care, as established by expert medical testimony,1 14
then she is not liable for medical malpractice regardless of whether the
patient feels he was adequately informed of the risks of treatment. 115
During the 1970s, an increasing number of U.S. states gravitated
toward a reasonable-patient standard.1 16 Currently, twenty-five states
retain the former standard, twenty jurisdictions (including the District of
Columbia) use a reasonable-patient standard, two states use a subjective-
patient standard, and four states use a mixed approach. 117 A good exam-
ple of the early reasonable-patient standard is provided in Canterbury v.
Spence.1 i8 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit decided that the medical profession should not determine the
degree of disclosure necessary to constitute adequate informed consent.
Instead, the court held that disclosure should depend on what "material"
factors would be necessary for the hypothetical "reasonable person" to
decide whether or not to undergo treatment. 1 19
110. Commission Directive, supra note 99, at 48.
111. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the history and tradition of
informed consent in every EU member state.
112. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The majority
opinion details the distinction between the professionally oriented standard and the
reasonable-patient standard.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 783 n.38.
115. Id.
116. JUDrH ApxEN Er AL., LAw, ScIENcE AND MEtnCIriE 384 (1984).
117. Szczygiel, supra note 7, at 209-10. A subjective-patient standard focuses on what
the patient in the particular case believes to be adequate disclosure, rather than what a
hypothetical reasonable person would find adequate. Id.
118. 464 F.2d at 787. In this case Dr. Spence performed a laminectomy on a nineteen
year old man suffering from back pain. A laminectomy is the excision of the posterior
portion of a vertebra. On the first day after the surgery, the man fell from his bed while
unattended. Consequently, he experienced difficulty breathing and became paralyzed
below the waist. Eventually he regained the use of his legs, but permanently required
crutches to walk and had difficulty with bowel and bladder incontinence. The patient
sued the doctor for failing to apprise him of the risks involved in the operation. Id. at
776-78.
119. Id. at 787.
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In contrast to the development of the reasonable-patient standard in
the United States, the House of Lords in the United Kingdom asserted that
the physician should have more discretion in prescribing medical treat-
ment. 120 Given this attitude toward professional discretion, it follows that
the United Kingdom and her fellow EU members would rely on the Decla-
ration of Helsinki for guidance. The Declaration places informed consent
in the context of medical experimentation subordinate to physician discre-
tion, thus narrowing the scope of the former for the sake of the latter.
Alternatively, the Nuremberg Code makes informed consent "abso-
lutely essential." 121 Although the Code has not been widely followed in
the United States, 122 almost half of all American jurisdictions base their
informed-consent standards on patient self-determination, rather than
medical practice. 123 Moreover, any entity receiving federal funds for
biomedical research must meet stringent informed-consent require-
ments.124 Clearly, there is a marked difference between U.S. and EU per-
spectives on the issue of informed consent in medical experimentation.
C. Informed Consent in Japan
Significantly, the Japanese have no term that is the equivalent to the West-
ern phrase informed consent.125 Indeed, until recently, Japanese doctors
rarely obtained informed consent before performing a medical procedure
or conducting medical research.126 Instead, for many years, the Japanese
120. See Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors, 1 All E.R. 643 (H.L. 1985)
(holding that professional judgment should determine what medical treatment risks are
disclosed to patients). The plaintiff suffered spinal cord damage as the result of an oper-
ation. The physician had warned her in simple terms of some risks, but failed to mention
possible damage to the spinal cord. Id.
The following story further illustrates the distinct approaches to the respective respon-
sibilities of patient and physician. In the United States, an older man was admitted to a
hospital with cardiac pathology. The diagnosis was explained to the patient, as were the
competing alternatives available for treatment. He was then given a video explaining the
two procedures and encouraged to watch the tape and discuss it -with his family. The
decision between by-pass surgery or angioplasty was left to him. In the United King-
dom, a man of similar age, having the same type of cardiac trouble visited a hospital.
Leaving the man and his family at one end of the room, a group of doctors proceeded to
huddle around his x-rays, occasionally glancing up at him. At the end of their discus-
sion one of the doctors said to his patient, "Sir, here's what we're going to do for you."
The doctors never gave the man any information upon which to base a decision. In fact,
the man and his family were completely excluded from the decision-making process.
Interview with David C. Lodemore, Editor-in-Chief, Cornell Law Review (Jan. 9, 1996)
(the men in the account are his father-in-law and father, respectively).
121. Nuremberg Code, supra note 28.
122. See supra discussion accompanying notes 29-37.
123. Szczygiel, supra note 7, at 209-10.
124. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
125. Nobuyuki Honna, Cultural Insights; Loan Words from English Have Important
Roles to Play, DAmY YoMIUm,July 31, 1995, at 8. Informed consent (i.e. explaining medi-
cal treatment issues to a patient and seeking her agreement) is not a concept that is
easily expressed in Japanese. Direct translation would not convey the correct idea. Id.
126. Gov't to Work Out Manual on Informed Consent, MAiNiCHi DAILY NEws, July 16,
1993.
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have practiced an extremely paternalistic type of medicine.' 27 For exam-
ple, many Japanese physicians refuse to tell their patients that they have
been diagnosed with cancer. 128 Historically, the Japanese populace sup-
ported this system; a 1989 public opinion poll found that only thirty-seven
percent of the respondents believed that a person with cancer should be
informed of her condition.129
However, public opinion is beginning to change. A 1994 survey of
2,000 Japanese citizens revealed that sixty-four percent of the respondents
would want to be told if they had cancer. 130 Currently, Japanese doctors
utilize a case-by-case approach, informing a patient when they believe the
truth will not exacerbate the patient's condition.' 31 In contrast, full disclo-
sure is currently the norm in the United States. 132 As of 1977, ninety per-
cent of U.S. doctors surveyed agreed that they would reveal a diagnosis of
cancer to their patient.133 This represents a dramatic shift in attitude; a
1961 poll had found that ninety percent of U.S. doctors would not tell a
patient diagnosed with cancer of his condition. 134
In Japan, several patients and families have sued their doctors for fail-
ing to disclose a cancer diagnosis, 135 and at least one patient has sued her
doctor for revealing the diagnosis.136 Japanese courts have generally dis-
missed both types of cases on the ground that physicians legally have great
127. Masao Onishi, Physician, Explain Thyself Doctors Must Get Down from Pedestal,
DAILY Yomnum, Dec. 15, 1992, at 9 (in a typical medical examination in Japan, the white-
gowned doctor arrogantly dispenses whatever treatment he deems best to the apprehen-
sive patient).
128. Norio Higuchi, The Patient's Right to Know of a Cancer Diagnosis: A Comparison
of Japanese Paternalism and American Self-Determination, 31 WASHBURN LJ. 455 (1992).
Historically, Japanese doctors have refused to reveal a cancer diagnosis to a patient
because it amounted to a death sentence. Id. Although now cancer is often treatable,
many Japanese doctors are still reluctant to inform patients, particularly when the prog-
nosis is poor, since they believe the shock may worsen the patient's condition. Id. at
456.
129. Id. at 455.
130. Joy Onozuka, Check It Out; The Bottom Line on Illness, DAiLY YOMIURI, Mar. 9,
1995, at 10.
131. Higuchi, supra note 128, at 456.
132. Id. ManyJapanese doctors criticize American doctors for disclosing too much to
patients. There is a suspicion that the American practice of full disclosure is motivated
more by the desire to avoid legal liability than a respect for the patient's autonomy. Id.
at 457. However, some American physicians assert that their Japanese counterparts are
too paternalistic. They claim that giving doctors so much discretion fails to recognize a
patient's right to self-determination. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The heightened awareness of informed-consent issues heralded by Beecher's
expos6 of unethical medical experimentation may explain this extraordinary change in
attitude. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
135. Higuchi, supra note 128, at 456 (citing Tokyo District CourtJudgment, Dec. 21,
1981, 1047 HI-Ii 101; Yokohama District Court Judgment, Nov. 25, 1988, 1317 Hji
114).
136. Id. at 456 (citing Nagoya District Court Judgment, May 27, 1983, 507 HANTA
282).
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discretion in deciding what medical information to share with a patient.13 7
However, a recent case, Makino v. Red Cross Hospital,138 broached the sub-
ject of patientjiko-kettei-ken (self-determination) for the first time.13 9 This
case involved a fifty-year-old nurse who went to the hospital complaining of
stomach pain.' 40 After making a tentative diagnosis of cholecystic (gall
bladder) cancer, the doctors advised her to schedule surgery as soon as
possible. 14 1 They told her only that her gall bladder was swollen; the word
cancer was never mentioned. 14 2 Makino scheduled an appointment for the
surgery for after her vacation. But, feeling better during the trip, she
neglected to keep the appointment. Two months later, she collapsed at
work and was rushed to the hospital, but it was too late to treat the cancer
effectively. She died within six months. 14 3 Her surviving family, a hus-
band and three children, sued the hospital for breaching a duty to disclose
the diagnosis of cancer. 144
The court held that the defendant doctors did not breach their duty of
care, reasoning that they had not reached a definitive diagnosis.' 45 How-
ever, the court held that even had the doctors reached a definitive diagno-
sis, they would still have had the discretion to decide how much
information to convey to the patient and her family.14 6 In this regard, the
decision appears unnoteworthy. However, for the first time, the court,
albeit in dicta, asserted that doctors have a general duty to inform the
patient or his family of the nature of the illness, any appropriate proce-
dure, and the intended effects of the therapy. 14 7 The court explained that
this duty is based on the patient's right of self-determination. 148 Although
a Japanese court used self-determination language for the first time, the
scope of the reform was limited by qualifying language granting doctors the
discretion to determine the extent of information to provide to the patient.
Therefore, physicians in Japan still have an immense amount of discretion
in deciding when, to whom, and what to disclose about medical treatment.
The discretion protecting medical treatment decisions extends into the
realm of medical experimentation. In the absence of government regula-
tion, Japanese pharmaceutical companies and doctors can test investiga-
137. Id. The courts rely on the importance of physician discretion in making the
"delicate" medical determination of whether particular information may worsen a
patient's condition. Id.
138. Id. at 458 (citing Makino v. The Red Cross Hospital, Nagoya District CourtJudg-
ment, May 29, 1989, 1325 HANJI 103).
139. Id. at 460-61.
140. Id. at 458.
141. Id. at 459.
142. Id. at 458-59.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 460.
146. Id. The court explained that in Japan a doctor would never be required to dis-
close a diagnosis of cholecystic cancer to a patient, since it is virtually incurable. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Self-determination is limited when the doctor decides that disclosure would
have possible adverse effects on therapy. In such a situation the physician may decide to
whom, when, and how much information he should divulge. Id.
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tional drugs on unsuspecting patients.1 49 Experimental drugs are tested
on thousands of patients without their knowledge, with pharmaceutical
companies paying up to $2,600 per research subject to hospitals.' 50 In the
past forty years there have been at least eleven major drug disasters in
Japan, affecting up to 20,000 people and killing several hundred. 15'
The most recent scandal involved the drug Sorivudine. In the 1980s,
the Japanese pharmaceutical company Nippon Shoji began plans to
develop a "smash-hit" drug which it hoped would increase the value of its
shares during a planned stock offering in 1991.152 The drug company
decided to market Sorivudine, an anti-viral agent previously rejected in
Europe as too dangerous. 153 When used in combination with certain
chemotherapy agents, the drug injures or kills most patients.' 5 4 During
clinical trials in Japan, Nippon Shoji replicated these negative results.
Three patients died within days of treatment with Sorivudine. 155 Two of
these deaths were kept secret, because, as a former company executive
explained, "'[ilt is normal (in the pharmaceutical industry) to close your
eyes to bad data ... it would be a big problem if a drug which cost billions
of yen to develop was not approved."' 15 6
Researchers reported one of the deaths, as well as an animal trial in
which every rat died, to the Health and Welfare Ministry's Medical Deliber-
ation Committee, theJapanese equivalent of the FDA.' 5 7 Nevertheless, the
Health and Welfare Ministry approved Sorivudine15 8 and Nippon Shoji
released the drug with great fanfare. The drug was prescribed at a dosage
of three pills a day, at a cost of $29.54 per pill. Nippon Shoji made $13
million in the first ten days.' 59 The packaging contained a small warning
label advising patients not to combine Sorivudine with anti-cancer
149. Akihiko Nishiyama, New Rules Will Shake Drug Firms, NIHON KEtzA1 SHIMBUN
(APAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Sept. 22, 1990, at 25.
150. Ben Hills, Japan: Prescription for Disaster, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 30,
1994.
151. Id. For example, Enteroviroform, an anti-diarrheal drug, killed many people and
may have blinded as many as 3,000 others. In addition, many Western parents in Japan
take their children to the United States or Hong Kong for vaccinations because defective





156. Id. (quoting a former Nippon Shoji executive).
157. Id.
158. Id. Given the pressures on the Ministry, a denial of approval of the drug would
have been unlikely. First, the Japanese Committee has only two inspectors to verify the
validity of clinical data, as compared with the FDA's 100 inspectors, while Japan ingests
twice as many medical drugs per year as the United States. In addition, Nippon Shoji
spent $13,000 entertaining each government official involved. Finally, if officials
approve drugs, they can expect to be offered lucrative positions on a pharmaceutical
company's executive board when they take early retirement in their fifties. Id.
159. Id. Nippon Shoji's president, Takakazu Hattori, claimed in private that
Sorivudine was the most expensive drug on the market. The value of the company's
shares soared as a result of the profits generated by the drug. Id.
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drugs. 160 Many doctors did not even see the warning. 61 - However, a
larger warning would probably have made little difference. In Japan,
patients are generally not informed of the medications they receive and, as
such, a patient's medication history can be difficult for doctors, and impos-
sible for patients, to track.162 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
doctors rarely make appointments, so patients often see a different doctor
on each visit.163
Within two weeks of the drug's release the first death was reported to
both the company and the Health and Welfare Ministry.164 Eight days later
the death toll was up to eight.165 The Ministry finally issued a warning
fifteen days later, after eight more people had died.' 66 Although many
patients survived their experience with the drug, some sustained lasting
injuries, including keloids (painful scarring of the face and body), swollen
extremities, and difficulty urinating. 167 The chairman and president of
Nippon Shoji both resigned, and the Japanese government prosecuted
other company executives for insider trading.168
Following the Sorivudine scandal the Japanese government focused on
improving the drug-approval process 169 by proposing an informed-consent
requirement.170 Although the Sorivudine disaster was an important cata-
lyst, it did not single-handedly awaken concern about informed consent.
As early as 1992 a number of citizens' groups started campaigning for a
patients' rights law.17 ' Mr. Kondo, founder of the citizen action group
160. Id. The warning label did not contain a description of the potential for death or
severe injury resulting from the combination of Sorivudine and anti-cancer drugs. Id.
161. Id.
162. Sorivudine Should Not Have Been Approved, COMLINE DAILY NEws BIOTECH. AND
MED. TECH., Nov. 28, 1994.
163. James Sterngold, Japan's Health Care: Cradle, Grave and No Frills, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1992, at Al. Consider the story of 70-year-old Genji Ito as an illustration of a
typical visit to the doctor in Japan. Mr. Ito traveled 20 minutes by bicycle to get to the
Toho University Hospital. He arrived at 7:30, an hour before the doctors start seeing
patients. Because he was so early he was 69th in line. After waiting on a vinyl-covered
bench until noon, he saw the doctor briefly for his heart medication. InJapan, crowded
clinics and impersonal visits are the order of the day. On the positive side, Mr. Ito pays
just 900 yen ($7.25) a month for health care. Id.
164. Hills, supra note 150.
165. Id. Minutes from a meeting at Nippon Shoji headquarters prove that company
executives knew of the mounting death toll. The company expected the deaths to
remain a "secret wvithin the company." Id.
166. Id. The belated warning saved company employees money. The day of the
Health Ministry's warning 175 employees of Nippon Shoji dumped their shares on the
market, personally saving millions of dollars. "After the announcement, [the company]




170. Pharma Japan Statistics; Ethical Drug Market Trends, COMLINE DAILY Naws
BIOTECH. AND MED. TECH., Nov. 13, 1995.
171. Kaoruko Aita, Citizens' Groups Seek Bill to Protect Patients' Rights, JAAN TmEs
WKLY. (International Edition), Oct. 19, 1992, at 14. The group wants to create a system
to review medical malpractice claims. About 350 new malpractice claims are filed each
year. Plaintiffs rarely win these cases in court, even though the citizens' group asserts
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Nagano, explained that it is unusual for Japanese doctors to tell patients
anything about their illnesses or treatments. 172
Another group, Kanja no kenriho wo tsukurukai (Association to Create
Patients' Rights) has held symposia to discuss questions people should ask
their doctors about their diagnoses and treatments.' 73 The group consists
of lawyers, nurses, welfare workers, and patients who believe that the legal
system must help protect patients' rights.17 4 Membership has grown from
fifty to five hundred in just a year.175 Doctors have also become involved
in the movement. The 24th General Assembly of the Japan Medical Con-
gress in 1995 focused on the "human side of medical treatment," rather
than more traditional subjects, such as the progress of medical science.17 6
In years past, the physicians had relegated informed consent to a
subordinate position in discussions. In 1995, by contrast, there was a dra-
matic increase in attendance at the seminar on informed consent.' 77
In keeping with these trends, government regulation of informed con-
sent in Japanese pharmaceuticals research is on the rise. In September
1989, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) announced Good
Clinical Practice (GCP) standards for Japan.' 78 As of late 1990, the MHW
no longer accepted research protocols not in conformance with the GCP
standards.' 79 However, the GCP standards focusing on informed consent
specify only that "written documentation is desirable."' 80 The GCP also
suggested the use of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) for any entity seek-
ing approval of drugs.' 8 ' Despite the proactive work by the MHW, the
GCP informed-consent standard serves only as a guideline in Japan.18 2
The MHW's Committee on the Study of Matters Related to Informed Con-
sent considered legally mandating adherence to written informed-consent
standards as suggested by the GCP, but concluded that such action would
that 70% to 80% of the medical records used by doctors to defend against malpractice
claims are altered. In fact, medical records are considered to be the doctor's property
and patients cannot access their own records. The citizens' group seeks to decrease
malpractice by requiring doctors to obtain informed consent for all medical procedures.
Id.
172. Id.
173. Akiko Fukami, Informed Consent: Doctor Says Patients Have Right to Know, JAPAN
TIMEs Wi.y. (International Edition), Aug. 17, 1992, at 8.
174. Id. The group proposes an informed-consent requirement, as vell as a non-juris-
dictional check system to investigate malpractice claims. Id.
175. Aita, supra note 171.
176. Kazuo Maeno & Futoshi Kataoka, Medical Congress Discusses 'Humane' Treat-
ment, DAILY Yomium, Apr. 17, 1995, at 3.
177. Id.
178. Japan: GCP to Be Implemented in Fall 1990, CHE.icAis Bus. NEws BASE, Dec. 1,
1989.
179. Id.
180. National Cancer Center Introduces New Clinical Trial Method for Anticancer
Agents, COMLINE DAILY NEws BIoTECH. AND MED. TECH., Apr. 24, 1995.
181. Study on Proper Clinical Trial Methods to Start Soon, COMLINE DAILY NEWs
BIOTECH. AND MED. TECH., Jan. 30, 1995. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
Vol. 30
1997 Knowledge Is the Best Medicine
be "inappropriate."183
At a 1994 meeting of the Japanese Society of Clinical Pharmacology
and Therapeutics, a majority of the members of the New Drugs Subcom-
mittee reported that problems with the pharmaceuticals approval system
persisted.184 Specifically, they indicated in the questionnaire that the
pharmaceutical industry continues to place too little emphasis on informed
consent. 185 Indeed, a physician at the Osaka City General Hospital per-
formed a survey in 1992 in which only sixty-one percent of physician
respondents claimed that they explain clinical trials to the subjects
involved. 186 Other approval problems exist as well. For example, an inves-
tigation by the deputy director of the Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Divi-
sion of the MHW's Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau discovered that
pharmaceutical companies attempted to circumvent the IRB require-
ments. 187 "In many [drug] companies, the head of the r[esearch] and
d[evelopment] section serve[d] as the IRB chairperson."' 88 Because IRBs
function as watchdogs of the research and development divisions of phar-
maceutical companies, having the head of the division serve as the IRB
chairperson is like having "a fox guarding the chicken coop."189 In
response, the government has stressed the importance of an independent
chairperson. 190
Currently, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau inspects all pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers and medical facilities conducting clinical trials on new
drugs to determine whether they are adhering to GCP standards. 191 The
Bureau also continues to encourage practitioners and drug companies to
obtain written informed consent. 192 To date, even when doctors obtain
informed consent, they provide simplistic explanations and receive only
verbal consent. 193 In fact, in a recent survey of clinical investigators, only
48.9% agreed that a researcher should always obtain informed consent in
183. Informed Consent-Integral Part of Clinical Trials on New Drugs, COMLINE DAILY
NEws BIOTECH. AND MED. TECH., July 3, 1995.
184. The 15th General Meeting of the Japanese Society of Clinical Pharmacology and
Therapeutics, COMLINE DAILY NEws BIOTECH. AND MED. TECH., Dec. 26, 1994.
185. Id. The questionnaire addressed pharmaceutical approval-process topics,
including approval application fees, review procedures, clinical trial methodology, and
clinical trial guidelines. Id.
186. Most Cancer Patients Want to Be Fully Informed, COMLINE DAILY NEWs BIOTECH.
AND MED. TECH., Mar. 6, 1995. See supra note 101 for a definition of clinical trial.
187. Importance of IRB Independence Stressed, COMLINE DAILY NEWs BIOTECH. AND
MED. TECH., Sept. 25, 1995.
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting Kazuhiko Mori, deputy director of the Pharmaceuticals and Cosmet-
ics Division of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau).
190. Id.
191. Japan: GCP Inspections Started on Full Scale in Japan, CHEMICALS Bus. NEWS BASE,
June 4, 1993. The inspections emphasize clinical-trial contracts, informed consent, pres-
ervation of records, and institutional review boards. Id.
192. Japan: PAB to Place Greater Importance on Informed Consent in Clinical Trials,
CHEMICALS Bus. NEws BAE, Oct. 13, 1994.
193. Yomiuri Shimbun, Cancer Center to Implement 'Informed Consent' System, DAILY
YOMIURI, July 27, 1995, at 3.
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writing.19 4 Interestingly, the responses strongly support strengthening the
other GCP guidelines. 195
In a recent incident, thirteen people died in a clinical trial for Irinote-
can Hydrochloride, an anti-cancer agent.196 This catastrophe sparked
renewed efforts from the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau of the MHW. 19
7
Allegedly, all thirteen patients had given informed consent, but only six of
them had done so in writing. 19 8 Mr. Tanaka, a spokesperson for the
Bureau, asserted that "[tiop priority must be placed on patients' rights in
clinical trials, and for this purpose, informed consent must be obtained in
writing whenever possible according to the GCP manual."19 9
The MHW's development of GCP standards and the public's demand
for patients' rights indicate that Japan is beginning to believe in the impor-
tance of informed consent. However, the strength and nature of this com-
mitment is yet to be fully defined. Over half of all Japanese doctors
surveyed still believe it is not necessary to obtain formal, written, informed
consent from research subjects.20 0 Indeed, a recent study found that only
three out of twenty-six patients participating in clinical drug trials had
been asked for written, informed consent.2 0 1
Moreover, Japanese doctors still describe informed consent as a "doc-
tor's 'explanation"' and a "patient's 'consent." 20 2 Under this model,
patients are neither encouraged nor made to feel comfortable enough to
ask questions.20 3 This system may not represent a great improvement over
the old authoritarian method, as detailed explanations given without atten-
tion to actual patient understanding only serve to confuse the patients. 20 4
Another danger of this cursory definition of informed consent is that
patients are thought to be gaining ground in health care self-determination,
but in reality, doctors still have the final word in medical treatment
decisions. 205
As an illustration of ongoing Japanese medical paternalism, consider
the Medical Practitioners Law.20 6 Article 22 outlines the physician's duty
194. Consensus Not Reached on Informed Consent in Clinical Trials, COMLINE DAILY
NEws BIOTECH. AN MED. TECH., Sept. 12, 1995 [hereinafter Consensus Not Reached].
195. Role of Chief Investigators in New GCP Not Clear, COMLINE DAILY NEws BIOTECH.
AND MED. TECH., Sept 12, 1995. In particular, the survey response indicated agreement
among chief investigators for strengthening GCP inspections and for thorough monitor-
ing- Id.
196. Informed Consent Must Be Obtained in Writing: Mr. Tanaka of the PAB, COMLINE




200. Consensus Not Reached, supra note 194.
201. Yomiuri Shimbun, Editorial, Protecting Patients' Human Rights, DAILY YOMIURI,
Apr. 26, 1995, at 6.




206. Medical Practitioners Law (Civil Code), Law No. 201 of 1948 (Supp. 1991)
(Japan).
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to deliver a prescription directly to the patient or patient's caregiver.20 7
However, the mandate provides for a number of exceptions. For example,
when a doctor believes that the prescription may make the patient
"uneasy," he does not have to give the prescription to the patient.208
D. Informed-Consent Standards Compared
A comparison of the approaches to informed consent taken by the United
States, the European Union, and Japan clarifies how disparate the cultures
are in this respect. The three parties to the ICH appear to lie on a contin-
uum with self-determination at one end and medical paternalism at the
other. The United States is positioned at the self-determination end,
emphasizing the right of individuals to make informed decisions about
whether or not to participate in experimental medical treatment.20 9 Japan
is found close to the medical-paternalism border. Only recently have Japa-
nese citizens begun to agitate for patient rights, including the right to be
fully informed before making medical decisions.210 The European Union
lies somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. As represented by the
United Kingdom, these nations agree that informed consent is important,
but focus at least as much on medical progress.2 11 Physicians still hold a
great deal of discretion in medical decision-making, even of an experimen-
tal nature. 212 It is in this setting of conflict that these three parties formed
the International Conference for Harmonization to attempt, inter alia, to
standardize their disparate informed-consent procedures.
II. The International Conference for Harmonization
In October 1989, a conference of regulatory officials from Japan, the
United States, and the EU met in Paris with a representative of the Interna-
tional Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations
(IFPMA). 213 The participants agreed to a joint meeting including all of the
sponsoring regulatory agencies, thereby creating the ICH.2 14 The ICH is a
joint effort between the United States, Japan, and the EU to identify and
reduce differences in the requirements for pharmaceuticals approval.215
207. Id. art. 22 (Duty to Deliver Prescription).
208. Id.
209. See supra Part I.A.1.
210. See supra Part I.C.
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. Id.
213. P.F. D'Arcy & D.W.G. Harron, Proceedings of the First International Conference on
Harmonization Brussels 1991, 1991 IN'L FED'N PHARMACEUTiCALS MFRS. AsS'N 8-9 (1991).
Located in Geneva, Switzerland, the IFPMA acts as an international consultant to the
pharmaceutical industry on all issues relating to the research and manufacture of pre-
scription medications. Id. at xxiii.
214. Id.
215. Nightingale, supra note 18, at 3. The work of the ICH is conducted by 1) Expert
Working Groups, 2) the Steering Committee in charge of oversight and policy, com-
posed of two members of the regulatory agency of each country, two industry represent-
atives from each country, and one person from each of three observer groups from
Canada, the European Free Trade Area, and the World Health Organization, 3) an ICH
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The six sponsors include the European Commission, 216 the European Fed-
eration of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations, the Japanese Ministry of
Health and Welfare, the Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, the U.S. FDA (the Center for Drug Evaluation and the Center for
Research and Biologics Evaluation and Research, divisions of the FDA),
and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.2 17 A
partnership between these three socio-political regions is logical since,
taken together, they develop the great majority of all new drugs. 218
A. ICH Goals
The ICH was founded to standardize pharmaceutical development prac-
tices and procedures between the three participants. 2 19 It has two primary
goals. The first goal is to decrease the costs of drugs to consumers by
minimizing regulatory problems associated with the need to comply with
the differing requirements of each country, thereby lowering research and
development costs. 2 20 The second goal is to increase the safety, efficacy,
and quality of pharmaceuticals. 22 1 The FDA has characterized the public
health benefits of these tripartite regulatory negotiations 22 2 as follows: 1)
to decrease the spread of disease within and between countries, 2) to
increase consumer access to safe and effective drugs, 3) to improve the
quality, safety, and efficacy of imported pharmaceuticals, and 4) to
improve information transfer between countries on public health issues.2 23
The FDA Commissioner also claims that ICH efforts have enormous poten-
tial to limit duplication in research and therefore, will result in a major
breakthrough by making a common registration process a reality.22 4
B. ICH Process
One of the first items on the agenda at the first ICH conference was the
formulation of the structure of the ICH and its process for creating harmo-
coordinator, which rotates depending on which nation is sponsoring the current confer-
ence, and 4) a Secretariat to coordinate the ICH process, provided by the IFPMA. Id. at
4.
216. The European Commission is the executive body of the EU. D'Arcy & Harron,
supra note 213, at xxi.
217. Draft Guidelines, supra note 19, at 42948.
218. Nightingale, supra note 18, at 3. The countries hold a conference every two years
in one of the member countries. Id. at 4. The first conference was located in Brussels,
Belgium in 1991. In 1993, Orlando, Florida hosted the conference. Yokohama, Japan
was the site of the most recent conference held in November 1995. D'Arcy & Harron,
supra note 213, at 2.
219. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
220. Contrera, supra note 17, at 928.
221. Id.
222. See infra Part II.C.
223. THE FDA TASK FORCE REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION, REPORT TO THE
COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS OF DECEMBER 1992 (1992).
224. Dr. David A. Kessler, FDA Commissioner, Keynote Address at the Second Inter-
national Conference of Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (Oct. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Kessler Address].
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nized standards.225 The ICH members established a five-step process
which includes: 1) the prioritization of problems by Expert Working
Groups (EWGs), 2) approval of the EWGs' recommendations by the Steer-
ing Committee and promulgation of draft guidelines, 3) review of the draft
guidelines by each party, 4) acceptance of the final guidelines by the par-
ties, and 5) incorporation of final guidelines into each nation's pharmaceu-
tical production regulations.2 26
225. The ICH Steering Committee met in April 1990 to set the goals and structure of
the ICH process. D'Arcy & Harron, supra note 213, at 9.
226. Id. In the first step of the ICH process the Expert Working Groups (EWGs)
prioritize the harmonization issues with which they are dealing. The probability of
reaching a group consensus is factored into the priority decision. Id. at 9. Each of these
issues represents a regulatory difference between two or more of the parties. When
confronting a harmonization problem, the group first lists several general considera-
tions that should be followed when promulgating a regulation governing pharmaceutical
testing. Id. at 9. Drafting committees composed of representatives from each party's
regulatory agency build draft guidelines around these considerations. Contrera, supra
note 17, at 940 n.57 (citing INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION OF TEcHNI-
CAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR HuMAN USE, CLOSING
REPORT, STATUS OF HARMONIZATION INTATrvEs, Annex 5, 17 (1993)) [hereinafter CLOSING
REPORT]. FDA technical experts from both the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research participate in these drafting
efforts. Contrera, supra note 17, at 941 n.57 (citing Draft Memorandum from FDA on
FDA/ICH Stages of Document Development I (Dec. 23, 1993)) [hereinafter FDA Memo-
randum]. In the United States, the proposed standards are then made available to the
public for comment. The FDA Office of the General Counsel and the FDA Office of
Policy approve the final FDA draft. Id. at 2. Eventually, the EWG adopts party consen-
sus draft guidelines which are forwarded to the ICH Steering Committee. Id.
Step two of the ICH process involves the Steering Committee's approval of the EWG's
recommendations. The Steering Committee first sends a copy of the consensus draft
guidelines to each of the regulatory agencies for consultation pursuant to its internal
consultation process. Each regulatory body reviews the guidelines for policy considera-
tions and approves the draft. CLOSING REPORT, supra, at 17. At the FDA, the draft then
goes back to the Office of General Counsel for final clearance before being published for
public comment. The content of the draft guidelines and a request for public comment
are published in the Federal Register. Contrera, supra note 17, at 940 n.57 (citing INrra-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION
OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR HUMAN USE, REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITrEE MEETING,
March 9-10, 1993, Brussels 9 (1993) (ICH document Ref: ICH 2/14)) [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMr-rrEE].
Step three involves review of the comments and draft guidelines. In the United States,
the FDA responds to public comments following publication of the draft guidelines in
the Federal Register. The Office of General Counsel and the Office of Policy examine the
revised guidelines after this round of notice and comment. After approval by these two
offices, the FDA transmits the results to the appropriate EWG for its approval. The EWG
then sends the tripartite guidelines to the Steering Committee for further approval. FDA
Memorandum, supra, at 2.
Step four involves the ICH acceptance of the final tripartite guidelines. After receiving
the final iteration of the draft guidelines, the Steering Committee either approves the
draft or recommends changes. If approved the Steering Committee submits the harmo-
nized tripartite guidelines to the regulatory agencies of each party for adoption accord-
ing to the party's internal procedures. CLOSING REPORT, supra, at 17. In the United
States, the FDA Steering Committee approves the document before the General Counsel
and the Office of Policy see it once again. The FDA then publishes a notice of final rule
in the Federal Register. FDA Memorandum, supra, at 3.
The fifth step of the ICH process concerns the incorporation of the guidelines into
each party's pharmaceutical production regulations. CLOSING REPORT, supra, at 17. In
229
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As part of the first step, the Steering Committee 22 7 appoints EWGs 2 28
composed of scientists recognized as experts in their fields.229 There are
three general EWGs which focus on safety, efficacy, and quality respec-
tively. 230 These groups usually meet at the same time as the Steering Com-
mittee, although they sometimes participate in six-member drafting
sessions in order to ensure progress on a specific guideline. 231 Only a
meeting at which at least one member from each of the six sponsors is
present constitutes an "official" meeting.23 2 The goal of the Efficacy EWG
is to enable the efficient development of new drugs worldwide.233 The four
topics addressed by this EWG include clinical safety requirements, studies
on the geriatric sub-populations of patients, design methods or require-
ments for dose-response trials, and definitions of good clinical practice. 234
In August 1995, the FDA published draft guidelines created by the
Efficacy EWG for "Good Clinical Practice." 235 The purpose of the guide-
lines is to "define 'Good Clinical Practice' and to provide a unified stan-
dard for designing, conducting, recording, and reporting trials that involve
the participation of human subjects."236 Requiring compliance with the
standard is intended to assure the public that the rights, well-being, and
confidentiality of persons participating in pharmaceuticals research will be
safeguarded.237 These guidelines will not only standardize human-sub-
jects research among the United States, Japan, and the European Union,
the United States, the FDA makes the requisite changes in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. If it becomes necessary to amend the regulation, the FDA reviews any further
comments. FDA Memorandum, supra, at 3.
227. The Steering Committee oversees both the preparation for each ICH meeting and
the development of the harmonization initiatives via the ICH process. REPORT OF THE
STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 226, at 9.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. CLOSING REPORT, supra note 226, at 15.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. D'Arcy & Harron, supra note 213, at 351. The Safety EWG concentrates on the
toxicological aspect of pharmaceuticals. CLOSING REPORT, supra note 226, at 4-5. Toxi-
cology is the study of a drug's harmful properties. GOODMAN & GILMAN'S THE PHARMA-
COLOGIcAL BASIs OF THRAPaxrTcs 2 (Alfred Goodman Gilman et al. eds., 1980). The
Quality EWG deals with stability testing, specifications for drug classification and dos-
age form, and standardization of pharmacopoeias. D'Arcy & Harron, supra note 213, at
39. Because this Note focuses on informed consent, only the Efficacy EWG will be dis-
cussed at length.
234. D'Arcy & Harron, supra note 213, at 351. Another example of draft guidelines
produced by this EWG is Studies in Support of Special Populations (Geriatrics; Draft
Guideline Availability), 58 Fed. Reg. 21,082 (1993). In addition, the Steering Committee
has issued consensus draft texts from the Efficacy EWG to the larger group for consulta-
tion. These include: "Dose Response Information to Support Drug Registration," "Gui-
dance on Clinical Safety Data Management-Definitions and Standards for Expedited
Reporting," and "The Extent of Population Exposure Required to Assess Clinical Safety
for Drugs Intended for Long-Term Treatment." CLOSING REPORT, supra note 226, at 10-
11.
235. Draft Guidelines, supra note 19.
236. Id. at 42,948.
237. Id.
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but will also bring these countries in line with the already-standardized
practices of Canada, the World Health Organization, Australia, and the
Nordic countries. 238 The guidelines address such specific considerations
in human-subjects research as confidentiality, the reporting of statistical
data, documentation, the involvement of vulnerable subjects, quality assur-
ance, the use of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), and informed
consent.239
To determine whether the ICH Good Clinical Practice guidelines are
sufficiently protective of pharmaceuticals research subjects' right to
informed consent, it is necessary to explore further the process by which
the guidelines were created. Specifically, it is important to evaluate how
well the interests of potential research subjects were represented in the
process.
C. ICH Use of Regulatory Negotiation
The ICH uses an international form of regulatory negotiation to formulate
guidelines. 240 Regulatory negotiation, also known as negotiated rulemak-
ing, occurs when an administrative agency brings all interested parties
together to create a proposed regulatory rule.2 41 The goal is to reach a
universally acceptable compromise. If all interested parties are satisfied
with the proposed rule, a streamlined notice-and-comment procedure
should result.242 In addition, parties who participated in formulating the
rule should be less apt to challenge it in court after it is finalized.243
238. Id.
239. Id. at 42,948-57.
240. Contrera, supra note 17, at 937.
241. PErER L. SRAuss Er AL, ADMINISTr VE LAW 400-02 (1995). See generally Philip
J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. .J. 1, 42-52 (1982) (dis-
cussing requisite factors for the success of regulatory negotiation). Generally, a regula-
tory agency may create rules on the basis of its own knowledge and information.
STRAUSS, supra, at 293. The proposed rule then enters the "notice-and-comment" process
during which interested parties may suggest modifications. Id. at 292 (citing Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1946)). Eventually, the agency adopts a final
rule, taking into consideration the comments it received. Id. at 293. In contrast, regula-
tory negotiation requires the agency to negotiate the content of a proposed rule before it
enters the notice-and-comment period. Id. at 400. Therefore, "Negotiated Rulemaking
... permits affected interests to have greater control over the content of agency rules
while ensuring fairness and balanced participation." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated
Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 74 GEo. LJ. 1625, 1627 (1986). Its history reveals that
regulatory negotiation is arguably successful. For example, none of the rules developed
as a result of negotiated rulemaking and issued as final rules by the Environmental
Protection Agency through 1987 has been litigated. Lee M. Thomas, The Successful Use
of Negotiated Rulemaking by EPA, 13 ADmaN. L. Naws 1, 3 (1987). But see Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43
DuKE LJ. 1206, 1206 (1994) (arguing that regulatory negotiation has been "oversold" as
a reform).
242. Neil Eisner, Regulatory Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED. B. NFws &
J. 349, 371-73 (1984).
243. Id.
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In determining whether regulatory negotiation is appropriate in a
given situation, the agency head should ask the following questions: 1)
will the rule significantly affect a limited number of readily identifiable
interests; 2) can persons be identified who will adequately represent the
significant interests; 3) are these persons willing to negotiate in good faith
to reach a workable compromise; 4) is there a reasonable possibility that
such a committee can reach a consensus within a relatively short period of
time so that the procedure does not delay the rulemaking process; 5) is the
agency willing and able to expend the necessary resources to provide ade-
quate technical and organizational assistance to the committee; and 6) is
the agency prepared to use the consensus as the basis for the proposed
rule?24 4
Although the ICH promulgates guidelines rather than rules,2 45 the
process can still be characterized as a type of regulatory negotiation. 24 6
The interested parties, i.e. the pharmaceutical industries in each of the
three regions and the drug-regulating bodies of each country, debate the
issues in an attempt to create guidelines that increase the safety and effec-
tiveness of drugs, while minimizing the research-and-development CoStS. 2 4 7
Because the pharmaceutical industries and the governmental regulatory
bodies are working together to find solutions, the rules resulting from the
process should be acceptable to both.24 8 However, the ICH form of regula-
tory negotiation may fail because it excludes other important interests-
specifically, the interests of potential research subjects.
111. Potential Implications for Informed-Consent Standards
By enabling the FDA to utilize foreign pharmaceuticals research, the ICH's
standardization of Good Clinical Practice guidelines will aid the FDA in its
quest to streamline its drug-approval process. 24 9 Unfortunately, the FDA
may be so eager to achieve this goal that it will overlook the potential nega-
tive outcomes to the ICH process. First, the FDA may be tempted to com-
promise the stricter informed-consent requirements of the United States in
order to achieve standardization. Second, even if the FDA refuses to loosen
American informed-consent requirements, it may accept the less protective
requirements of the EU and Japan in the name of harmonization. The fol-
lowing section argues that both of these possibilities would lead to conse-
quences of grave concern.
244. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 563 (1990). Although this is an
American statute, the ICH process is designed to work in a similar fashion. Contrera,
supra note 17, at 938.
245. The general guidelines of an administrative agency serve to alert the regulated
community of the agency's position on a given matter and are non-binding. In contrast,
rules bind both the agency and the regulated industry to a substantive norm. See Com-
munity Nutrition Institute v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
246. Contrera, supra note 17, at 937.
247. Id. at 938.
248. Id.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 255-60.
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A. Adoption of Less Stringent Standards
Thus far this Note has explored the differences in approaches to informed
consent between the countries participating in the ICH effort to standard-
ize pharmaceutical development. The ICH process fails to adequately
account for these differences in its Good Clinical Practice guidelines. The
result is an informed-consent standard insufficiently protective of human
research subjects.
As the country most protective of a person's right to determine for
herself whether or not to participate in medical experimentation, the
United States has the most to lose from relaxed informed-consent stan-
dards. The following discussion explores the FDA's incentives to loosen
informed-consent standards in the name of harmonization. Once the FDA
subscribes to diminished informed-consent standards there is little
recourse for potential research subjects. The ICH regulatory negotiation
process gives this group no meaningful opportunity to disagree with the
FDA since their interests are not represented in the process. In addition,
judicial review provides no recourse for potential research subjects given
the current state of beneficiary standing doctrine.250
The FDA faces great pressure to decrease the time and expense
involved in the drug-approval process. 251 Harmonization would assist the
FDA in its quest to expedite the process by eliminating the need to dupli-
cate clinical-drug-trial data from other countries.252 The present process is
problematic because it developed as a response to a series of crises.253
During these crises the public was unwilling to support solutions which
balanced safety with other considerations, such as cost.2 54 As a result, the
United States arguably has created a procedure that is both more costly
and time consuming than necessary.
Today the United States consistently lags behind other developed
nations in the approval of new drugs.255 The current time lag between the
synthesis of a new chemical entity and final FDA approval averages twelve
years. 256 It now costs an average of approximately $231 million to take a
new medicine from the laboratory to the pharmacy.257 Commentators
blame FDA regulations for both the time delay and its attendant costs.258
250. See infra notes 281-89 and accompanying text.
251. Kassel, supra note 15, at 95 n.9.
252. Kessler Address, supra note 224.
253. See supra Part I.A.2.
254. Kassel, supra note 15, at 104.
255. Id. at 95.
256. Ann Gibbons, Can David Kessler Revive the FDA?, 252 Sci. 200, 201 (1991). The
FDA is slower than the comparable agencies of other nations at every stage of the pro-
cess. For example, in 1988, the average review interval for a newly developed drug was
15 months in the country of first approval. The FDA required an average of 29.7 months
to review the same products. John C. Petricciani, Disease, Drugs, and Delay: Suggested
Changes for the FDA, 38 CUNacAL REs. 701, 701 (1990).
257. David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About Improvements at FDA,
70 CHEMICAL & ENGINEE R NG NEws 28, 28 (1992).
258. Kassel, supra note 15, at 97. The time delays not only reduce early access for
consumers, but also increase the cost of research and development. A one-and-a-half-
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According to them, the FDA drug-approval process prevents Americans
from obtaining innovative new drug therapies in a timely manner.25 9 For
example, some critics estimate that the Beta Blocker, Timolol, used in the
treatment of cardiovascular disease, could have prevented 100,000 Ameri-
can deaths had it been approved seven years earlier-the time at which it
went on the market in Europe.260 In other words, critics argue, the FDA is
causing needless deaths in the name of safety.
In an attempt to cure "drug lag," under the Bush administration the
President's Council on Competitiveness promulgated eleven specific
reforms in 1991.261 The FDA rejected the Council's proposal to expand
the use of foreign data and to recognize foreign approvals. 26 2 Tradition-
ally, the FDA has been wary of utilizing foreign studies because of a fear
that they would not adequately safeguard consumer safety. 26 3 Therefore,
at least one domestic clinical investigation must be performed by a
year decrease in approval time can cut five years off the time needed to recoup research
costs. Barry S. Roberts & Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update: The FDA Speeds Up Hope
for the Desperately Ill and Dying, 27 AM. Bus. I.J. 403, 405-06 n.13 (1989).
259. William Wardell, The Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Area of
Patterns of Drugs Marketed in the United States and Great Britain from 1972 Through
1976, 24 CLINIcAL PHAMAcoLoGY & THEwEa'rrcs 499, 521 (1978).
260. Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 76, at 597. Former FDA Commissioner
Hayes estimated that timolol would prevent approximately 17,000 deaths annually from
secondary myocardial infarctions (i.e. heart attacks secondary to another disease or
trauma). Anthony Hayes, Current FDA Directives for Promoting Public Health, 39 AM. J.
Hosp. PHARmccy 427, 428 (1982).
261. Recommendations to Speed Drug Approvals Issued, [1990-91 Transfer Binder]
Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) cl 42,603, at 43,617 (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Rec-
ommendations]. The recommendations were as follows:
(1) use of external review,
(2) expanded use of advisory committees,
(3) an expanded role for Institutional Review Boards,
(4) flexible interpretation of the efficacy standard,
(5) accelerated approval,
(6) expanded use of foreign data and recognition of foreign approvals in the
United States,
(7) enhanced computerization,
(8) establishment of a classification system for application priorities,
(9) use of internal systems of accountability,
(10) reduction of excessive liability costs, and
(11) direction of staff and financial resources toward new drug review.
Id. at 43,619-26.
262. New FDA Approval Guidelines Set, FAcTs ON FILE, May 14, 1992, at 353. This
recommendation would have required the FDA, in conjunction with foreign countries, to
develop common standards for clinical studies, a common format for submission of
drug approval applications, common sets of requirements for animal testing, criteria for
plant inspections and good manufacturing practices, a reciprocity for approvals, and a
process for the mutual acceptance of data. Recommendations, supra note 261, at
43,623-24.
263. Halperin, supra note 14, at 168. The agency is concerned with the following
safety barriers implicated in accepting foreign data: the FDA's lack of familiarity with
foreign languages, Europe's shorter historical commitment to high-quality clinical trials,
discomfort with validating foreign data, poor design of foreign experiments, and a large
number of statistical problems. Lasagna, supra note 13, at 370.
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researcher recognized as competent by the FDA.2 64 Many scientists and
leaders of the pharmaceutical industry argue that such replication is waste-
ful and unnecessary.265
Perhaps the FDA's participation in the ICH signals a new acceptance
of standardization. Another possible interpretation is that the agency is
experiencing so much pressure to reform its drug approval process, espe-
cially in light of public demands engendered by the AIDS crisis, that it is
willing to ignore concerns about the differences in drug testing between the
parties to the ICH. The FDA has long held that standardization is inadvisa-
ble because: 1) foreign research protocols traditionally are less detailed
than American protocols in terms of judgment and measurement of effi-
cacy, 2) foreign researchers are unaccustomed to being closely monitored
through recorded data, 3) acclaimed foreign researchers are less amenable
to guidance from their sponsors, 4) human interpretation of statistical
norms and computer programs differ across cultures, 5) foreign companies
do not believe FDA standards are truly necessary, and 6) trial report docu-
ments in other countries contain less data than in the United States.266 If
the FDA is willing to compromise on these factors, it is certainly possible
that it might also be amenable to lowering informed-consent standards.
On the other hand, the FDA participation in the ICH may simply indicate
an interest in pursuing future international standardization. This is an
unlikely explanation, however, because the FDA has already signaled its
intent to adopt the ICH-GCP by publishing it in the Federal Register and
inviting public comment.267
A comparison between the FDA's current informed-consent stan-
dards2 68 and the ICH-GCP raises troubling issues. The FDA regulations
delineate specific requirements for informed consent, including an expla-
nation that the procedure is experimental, a description of the risks and
benefits involved, a promise of confidentiality, a statement of alternative
treatments, an explanation of medical therapy or compensation available
in case of injury, an opportunity to ask questions, and an assurance that
the subject is free to refuse to participate or to withdraw his consent at any
time without loss of benefits. 2 69 In contrast, the ICH guidelines are
extremely vague, instructing researchers only to give a subject information
that is "relevant" to his decision whether or not to participate. 270 The defi-
nition of informed consent in the ICH-GCP is:
A subject's voluntary confirmation of willingness to participate in a particu-
lar trial, after having been informed of all aspects of the trial that are relevant
to the subject's decision to participate. Informed consent is documented by
means of a written informed consent form that contains relevant informa-
tion about the trial and that is signed and dated by the subject or the sub-
264. Halperin, supra note 14, at 169.
265. Lasagna, supra note 13, at 369.
266. Id. at 370.
267. Draft Guidelines, supra note 19, at 42,948.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94.
269. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(1-8) (1985).
270. Draft Guidelines, supra note 19, at 42,949.
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ject's legally acceptable representative. 2 71
If the FDA replaces its current regulations with the ICH-GCP, potential
research subjects will have significantly less assurance that actual informed
consent will be obtained. Ironicallly, the ICH regulatory-negotiation pro-
cess will not allow these potential research subjects to advocate for a
stricter ICH informed-consent standard, because they are not included
among the groups represented at the ICH negotiations. Yet, surely an
essential interest lies with potential research subjects-they should have
been included. Indeed, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act2 7 2 cautions the
head of the agency to consider whether "there is a reasonable likelihood
that a committee can be convened with a balanced representation of per-
sons who can adequately represent the interests identified."273 Because
the ICH failed to invite this important interest to the bargaining table, the
process cannot guarantee respect for the research subjects' needs.
Nor can research subjects rely on the FDA to protect their interests
adequately. First, as this discussion indicates, the countervailing pressure
of responding to "drug-lag" criticism casts doubt upon the FDA's motiva-
tion for participation in the ICH. Second, the FDA may have fallen victim
to the peculiar group psychology of regulatory negotiation. In the process
of regulatory negotiation, the agency becomes merely another part of the
group, seeking consensus. 274 This position denies the agency's role as rep-
resentative of the public interest.2 75 This scenario is particularly problem-
atic in the case of the ICH, because all of the non-governmental
representatives are pharmaceutical companies. 27 6 Indeed, a federation of
these companies sponsors the ICH.2 7 7 It would be easy for the FDA to
focus exclusively on the pharmaceutical manufacturers' interests, espe-
cially in the wake of pressure to streamline the drug-approval process.
On the other hand, the notice-and-comment period may adequately
protect the public interest. The draft ICH-GCP specified that anyone could
petition the FDA to continue to protect patients' rights via stringent
271. Id.
272. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, supra note 244, § 563.
273. Id. § 563(a)(3)(A). Of course, the ICH process is not subject to the requirements
of the U.S. Negotiated Rulemaking Act since it is an international effort. However, as a
form of regulatory negotiation, the ICH process implicates identical considerations to
those addressed by the U.S. Act.
274. William Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENvTL. L. 55 (1987).
275. Id. at 57. See also Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (asserting that "the
rights of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the
[agency]"). By deeming the agency merely another party to the agreement, regulatory
negotiation limits the agency's responsibility for achieving consensus. As a result, the
mandate of the statute may be subordinated to achieving consensus. This reliance on
consensus for legitimacy is not problematic when all interests are represented. The fact
that unrepresented interests do not participate in the notice-and-comment period or
challenge the final rule in court does not indicate approval of the rule. Funk, supra note
274, at 57.
276. See supra part Il.A.
277. Nightingale, supra note 18, at 4. See supra text accompanying note 213.
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informed-consent requirements.278 The FDA has offered public work-
shops to discuss the draft guidelines. 279 However, this access to the FDA is
too limited to be effective. 280 Indeed, the interests of future research sub-
jects are extremely dispersed. No one knows when she may find herself in
the position of having to decide whether or not to take an experimental
drug. For this reason, most people who may someday become test subjects
are unlikely to respond to the FDA's invitation to comment on rules that
have no bearing on their current lives. Furthermore, notice is published in
the Federal Register, which few Americans read regularly.
Furthermore, if the FDA adopts the ICH-GCP, research subjects will
have no recourse until they are injured in a clinical trial performed with
inadequate informed consent. Given current U.S. standing doctrine, a per-
son will be unable to take the FDA to court prospectively to challenge the
adequacy of new informed-consent standards. Standing is the "key to the
courthouse door."281 A party has standing to sue if she has sufficient stake
in a controversy to create the need for judicial resolution of the issue.28 2
Since standing is judge-made law,28 3 the definition of sufficient interest
changes over time as courts reshape the concept. Currently, three U.S.
Supreme Court decisions collectively establish stricter standing require-
ments for beneficiaries of agency action than for the industries directly
regulated by the agency action.284
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife provides an explanation for this
trend.285 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court sharply curtailed the possi-
278. Draft Guidelines, supra note 19, at 42,948.
279. Nightingale, supra note 18, at 5 (describing public meetings held by the FDA to
explain the ICH process).
280. For instance, because interests represented by consumer groups are likely to be
well organized, they are able to make their voices heard. Yet, consumer groups' interests
may be more aligned with the pharmaceutical companies than with research subjects
because they demand that the FDA approve new drugs faster. See Kassel, supra note 15,
at 95 n.9.
281. STRAuss Er AL., supra note 241, at 1121.
282. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In this case, the U.S. Forest Service
accepted a bid by Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. to build a ski resort in the Sequoia
National Forest. Sierra Club sued the agency, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
planned development contravened federal national park preservation law. The court
held that although non-economic harm, such as loss of recreation in a national park,
can constitute the "injury in fact" required for standing, the Sierra Club did not have
standing because it had not made a showing that any of its members had sustained the
alleged injury. Id.
283. STmAUss Er AL., supra note 241, at 1121.
284. Id. at 1257. The cases are Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340,
351 (1984) (holding that a consumer suit against the Secretary of Agriculture was pre-
cluded because congressional intent to exclude such suits was "fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme"), Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that
plaintiff conservation groups lacked standing to sue the Secretaries of Commerce and
the Interior for promulgating regulations that misinterpreted the Endangered Species
Act), and Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (acknowledging Lujan's stricter standards for beneficiary standing).
285. 504 U.S. at 555. The Court held that the "desire to use or observe an animal
species, even for purely esthetic purposes" is a cognizable interest to support standing.
Id. at 562. However, the plaintiffs had not shown that they had any plans to travel to
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bility of standing for beneficiaries of administrative agency action. 28 6
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained that the likelihood of estab-
lishing standing "depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is him-
self an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue."287 If the plaintiff
is not the direct object of the agency action, then causation for an injury
suffered by the plaintiff depends on the response of a third party, namely
the regulated industry. 288 Because of the attenuated connection between
the agency's action- in this case, the regulation of the industry-standing
will be "substantially more difficult" for the beneficiary to assert. 289 Given
this analysis, it is probable that the current Court would bar a research
subject's prospective challenge of the FDA's acceptance of the narrower
ICH informed-consent standards.
Indeed, if challenged in court, the FDA could argue that whether a
research subject is injured by the relaxed informed-consent standard
depends upon the researcher's action. The FDA could claim that if the
pharmaceutical industry follows the ICH-GCP correctly, a research subject
should have sufficient knowledge to make an informed choice about
whether or not to participate in a clinical trial. In other words, the argu-
ment asserts, it is the pharmaceutical company's response to the guidelines
that is critical, rather than the FDA's promulgation of the guidelines. Of
course, in actuality, while the behavior of the pharmaceutical company as
research sponsor is certainly important, the public relies on the FDA to
ensure pharmaceutical manufacturers' compliance with minimal protective
standards. 290 Without the FDA holding them in check, these companies
may find the pressure to market new drugs pushing them to compromise
safety measures such as stringent informed-consent practices. Unfortu-
nately, U.S. standing doctrine, combined with an ICH process that can
afford to ignore patients' rights issues, may lead to the FDA's abdication of
its public protection responsibility.29 1
Egypt or Sri Lanka, where the animal species endangered by the projects partially
funded by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior, were located. Therefore, the
plaintiffs had demonstrated no "injury on fact." Id. In addition, the Court argued that
the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act violated the president's power
under Article II of the United States Constitution to execute federal law. Id. at 576.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 562.
289. Id.
290. Lasagna, supra note 13, at 322.
291. The interaction between the ICH process and standing doctrine is important
because an agency is less likely to ignore a party's interests during the rulemaking pro-
cess if that party is capable of hauling the agency into court to challenge the regulations
at the end of the process. STAuss Er A., supra note 241, at 1121. Because standing
doctrine precludes potential research subjects from suing the FDA over relaxed
informed-consent standards, the agency lacks this incentive to include their interests in
the ICH negotiations.
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B. Disregard for Important Cultural Differences
The FDA might continue to enforce current regulations in the United States
and accept ICH informed-consent standards only for purposes of reviewing
clinical trial data from the European Union and Japan. While a limited
adoption would benefit American citizens participating in pharmaceuticals
experimentation, whether the FDA should base drug approval on research
from countries that are not as protective of patients' rights remains ques-
tionable. The European Union's adoption of the Helsinki Declaration as its
standard for medical experimentation indicates that those countries are
willing to emphasize medical progress at the expense of informed con-
sent.29 2 The EU directive defining Good Clinical Practice states that the
member states support informed consent "in principle,"293 further calling
into question the EU commitment to informed consent.
Japan's medical paternalism is of even greater concern. On one hand,
the Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association supports the ICH-
GCP, although it recognizes that the Japanese GCP must be modified to
accommodate the new standards.294 On the other hand, a Japanese news-
paper reported that the only difference between the ICH-GCP and Japan's
informed-consent standards is that the former requires documentation. 295
Considering the Japanese medical community's past tendency to ignore
informed consent, this statement is disturbing.
If the Japanese believe that the only modification to their limited
informed-consent standards necessitated by the ICH is written documenta-
tion, the ICH informed-consent requirements are very weak. During
independent audits of compliance with Good Clinical Practice standards
carried out in the first ICH conference, Dr. Frances Kelsey, of the FDA
Division of Scientific Studies, discovered Japanese studies in which doctors
had not obtained consent because they expected it would be denied.296
Indeed, informed consent is still a new idea in Japan, as evidenced by the
lack of an equivalent expression in the Japanese language. 297 It is unrealis-
tic to believe that the Japanese will interpret the ICH definition of informed
consent with rigor comparable to that of the United States.
There are a number of reasons why cultural differences may lead to
substantial problems. The Japanese spend $80 billion per year on
pharmaceuticals. 298 They take twice as much medication as Americans,
292. See supra part LB.
293. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
294. Revised Japanese GCP Should Include IND Application System, COMLINE DAILY
NEWS BIOTECH. Am MED. TECH., Nov. 7, 1995 (IND is an abbreviation for "Investiga-
tional New Drug"). See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
295. ICH-GCP Draft Clarifies Responsibility of Sponsors, COMLINE DAILY NEws
BIOTECH. AND Ma. TECH., July 31, 1995.
296. D'Arcy & Harron, supra note 213, at 473.
297. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
298. Hills, supra note 150. The Japanese spend more on pharmaceuticals than on
their defense budget, and they spend almost twice as much on medicines as they do on
rice, their main food staple. Id.
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and three times more than the British.299 There is even a phrase, kusuri
zuke shaki, (drug-pickled society) for this particular social concern.300
One likely reason for the enormous amount of drugs taken is that doctors
rely on kick-backs from the pharmaceutical industry-estimated to be up to
a quarter of the $80 billion spent annually on pharmaceuticals-to supple-
ment their meager incomes. 301 Since informed consent is a controversial
notion, doctors often prescribe drugs to their patients without even telling
them what they are receiving.30 2 Further illustrating the problem, the Japa-
nese refer to their doctors with the title sensei (master).30 3 In Japan,
patients rarely ask questions.304
This cultural milieu presents pharmaceutical companies with the per-
fect opportunity to make a great deal of money. Doctors and pharmaceuti-
cal companies make money from selling drugs, and, because patients
rarely ask questions, there is ample opportunity to prescribe medication.
There is also an incentive to market as many new pharmaceuticals as possi-
ble. Many companies market "zoro-shin" ("me-too" drugs)-products with
small modifications from the original drug.305 The "new" but often worth-
less or dangerous medications provide doctors with even more drugs to
prescribe to unsuspecting patients, increasing the money earned by both
doctors and pharmaceutical companies. 306 Japanese pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers take this approach to create profits because they are "global min-
nows," with virtually no sales outside Japan.307 Small market share is due,
at least in part, to the refusal by other countries to acceptJapanese clinical-
trial data.308 Other countries consider Japanese drug research to be lack-
ing in thoroughness, and rarely publish papers submitted to academic
magazines by Japanese researchers. 309
This situation gives the Japanese pharmaceutical industry an incentive
to participate in harmonization efforts, but no good reason to genuinely
299. Id. The Japanese lead the world in pharmaceutical consumption. Japanese
Health Care; Keeping Well in Their Own Way, EcoNoMIsT, July 7, 1990, at 38 [hereinafter
Japanese Health Care]. See also Sterngold, supra note 163.
300. Hills, supra note 150.
301. Id. Japanese doctors are paid poorly under the national health care system. One
doctor estimated that he would need to see 150 patients per day in order to make a
living. The incentives for taking kickbacks from the pharmaceuticals companies is,
therefore, strong. The kickbacks come in the form of secret discounts on the approved
prices. Id. The MHV has attempted to end this practice, but the physicians comprise a
powerful lobby in Japan. Japanese Health Care, supra note 299, at 38.
302. Hills, supra note 150. Doctors often remove labels from prescription drugs
before giving them to a patient. Sterngold, supra note 163, at Al.
303. Hills, supra note 150.
304. See Onishi, supra note 127; Sterngold, supra note 163; Japanese Health Care,
supra note 299.
305. Japanese Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics: Me-Too Drug Trials
Pose Dilemma for Physicians, COMLINE DAILY NEws BIOTECH. AND MED. TECH., Nov. 27,
1995.
306. Hills, supra note 150.
307. Id.
308. Editorial, Orient Clinical Tests to Patients, DAILY YoMluRI, Dec. 3, 1995, at 5.
309. Id. Japanese clinical trial data is poorly rated by foreign countries because the
research is known to lack thoroughness. Id.
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strengthen informed-consent requirements. Surely such a state of affairs
should give the FDA pause. Consider the Sorivudine disaster, in which
fifteen people were killed and scores were injured when the drug was
released without satisfactory research.3 10 What might have happened after
pharmaceutical testing requirements had been completely harmonized if
Japan had developed the drug first? Instead of the dangerous drug being
released on only an unsuspecting Japan, Europe and the United States
would have marketed it as well. How many people would have been killed
by one company's profit motives? Stringent informed-consent require-
ments would have prevented the disaster from occurring in the first place.
If the subjects had been told of the risks, it is doubtful they would have
agreed to test the drug. For example, the fact that every rat died during the
animal trials3 1 1 would have indicated to potential research subjects that
the experimental drug was highly dangerous.
In this way, true informed consent serves as a check on pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers. If full disclosure results in a lack of research volun-
teers, then the drug may indeed be too dangerous to be marketed. The
FDA should remain mindful of this protective aspect of informed consent.
Consumer groups, economists, doctors, and pharmaceutical companies
may chastise the FDA for taking too long to approve new drugs,3 1 2 but the
same groups would blame the FDA if something like the Sorivudine disas-
ter occurred in the United States.
Even if Japan's minimalist approach to informed consent would not
lead to safety problems in the United States, the question remains: should
Americans condone a system that ignores the individual's right to self-
determination in matters of bodily integrity? This right has long been cen-
tral to our concept of justice.3 13 Although informed consent has been a
foreign concept to the Japanese, Japanese citizens have now formed
patients' rights groups with growing membership.3 14 Because Americans
believe that self-determination is a basic human right, we should consider
310. See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.
311. Hills, supra note 150.
312. Petricciani, supra note 256, at 701.
313. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 92-93 (N.Y. 1914)
(Cardozo, J.) ("[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body."). Ironically, the plaintiff, who complained
that her doctors had performed an operation to remove a fibroid tumor without her
consent, lost the case. Judge Cardozo asserted that the hospital could not be held
accountable for the actions of the private physicians who admitted patients. That is,
there was no master-servant relationship between the hospital and doctors upon which
to base hospital liability. Id. However, other informed-consent cases have cited the con-
cept of self-determination represented by the case with approval. See e.g. Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). As a
necessary incident of self-determination, informed consent in the medical context is now
widely accepted in the United States. See Problems in Securing Informed Consent of Sub-
jects in Experimental Trials of Unapproved Drugs and Devices: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Technology of the Committee on Small
Business, 103d Cong. 1 (1994) (opening statement of Chairman Wyden).
314. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (discussing the growing patients'
rights movement injapan).
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the moral implications of condoning informed-consent standards which
impair the struggle of Japanese patients to obtain control over medical
treatment decisions.
IN. Recommendations
Since participation by all significant interests is a requirement for success-
ful regulatory negotiation,315 the ICH process should be open to groups
representing human research subjects' rights from each of the three parties
to the ICH. However, direct involvement by groups representing human
research subjects is not, by itself, enough to provide for adequate public
participation. The issues surrounding human-subjects research is suffi-
ciently important to all Americans to make participation in the notice-and-
comment procedure readily accessible to the general public. To ensure the
feasibility of such participation, the draft guidelines produced during the
ICH process should be published more conspicuously. For example, phy-
sicians should distribute FDA pamphlets to their patients, explaining any
ICH proposals that affect research subjects' rights. Another possibility is
advertising notice-and-comment procedures through newspapers, radio,
and television.
In addition to public participation, the stringent informed-consent
standards that we currently enjoy in the United States should be protected
via legislation. To this end, current HHS/FDA informed-consent regula-
tions could be repackaged as a research subjects' and patients' rights stat-
ute passed through the bicameral-presentment process. The involvement
of both houses of Congress, as well as the president, will ensure that all
interests are represented through the political process.316 This step is nec-
essary because agency regulations can change easily with changes in the
White House.3 17 The legislation must also define the agency's mandate
unambiguously to prevent each new FDA Director from re-interpreting the
statutory requirements.318 In the meantime, the FDA should advocate for
rigorous ICH-GCP informed-consent guidelines so that a country reviewing
pharmaceutical clinical trials from another country can ascertain whether
or not the researchers obtained genuine informed consent.
315. See supra Part II.C.
316. In contrast to the political process in which all interests are represented by defi-
nition, regulatory negotiation is not democratically legitimate unless all interests are
explicitly represented. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 241, at 1211.
317. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assoc. of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 2958 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(explaining that the agency's modifica-
tion of regulations seemed to be in response to the election of a new president from a
different political party).
318. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language is entitled to deference). The Court further held that an
agency's construction of an unclear statute may rely upon the incumbent administra-
tion's policy views; however, an agency must give effect to the unambiguously stated
intent of Congress. Id. at 843.
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Conclusion
Historically, researchers have used humans in medical experimentation
with little regard for their right of self-determination. The most notorious
example of this fact is the experimentation carried out on concentration-
camp inmates by doctors of Nazi Germany. However, Americans have also
been treated like guinea pigs in the name of medical science, as incidents
like the Tuskegee Syphilis Study illustrate. In response to this blatant dis-
regard for individual freedom, the United States has gradually developed
relatively stringent informed-consent requirements. These standards are
necessary to ensure that persons involved in medical research receive
knowledge of the risks and benefits material to a truly informed decision
about their participation. Other countries have also stressed the impor-
tance of informed consent, but have not weighed the individual's right of
self-determination as heavily against other considerations as has the
United States. For example, the European Union supports informed con-
sent "in principle," but seems to place the importance of medical progress
in the ascendant position. The Japanese society is just beginning to recog-
nize the validity of informed consent in the medical setting. Japan still
represents an overtly paternalistic culture in which doctors make most of
the treatment and research decisions.
Against the backdrop of these cultural disparities, the three partici-
pants formed the International Conference on Harmonization to standard-
ize their pharmaceutical development processes. As part of the Good
Clinical Practices fashioned by the ICH, the participants have developed a
vague standard for informed consent. The lack of clarity stems partially
from the need to define this value-laden concept in a manner acceptable to
all three cultures. The danger is that, in a rush to respond to criticism
from those who claim the FDA's drug-approval process is too slow, the
FDA may relax U.S. informed-consent standards to better fit the ICH group
consensus. If this is the case, potential medical-research subjects, very
often patients with debilitating illnesses, will have inadequate protection
against researchers who fail to comprehensively inform them of the risks
involved.
The ICH process fails to protect potential research subjects' interests
because they are not included in the negotiations over how best to harmo-
nize pharmaceuticals research. In fact, the American public is only periph-
erally involved in the ICH process via the notice-and-comment period.
This limited opportunity for involvement is insufficient to grant research
subjects an effective voice in the process since the courts will be dosed to
anyone wishing to challenge the new standards prospectively, given the
current trend away from beneficiary standing.
Even if the FDA does not replace the current informed-consent require-
ments with those detailed in the ICH-GCP, the question remains: should
the U.S. condone potentially harmful medical paternalism by accepting
clinical-trial data from countries with less stringent informed-consent stan-
dards? Two concerns are implicated. First, the less-protective informed-
consent standards of other countries could injure American consumers if
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the FDA accepts their clinical-trial data without question in the name of
harmonization. Second, even if American consumers can be protected,
arguably, the United States should not condone human-subjects research
performed in other countries without the assurance that participants are
fully informed of the potential risks.
In the United States, every individual is free to determine her life's
path without the interference of the government, as long as she does not
interfere with others' rights to do the same. This commitment to self-deter-
mination is no less an important part of our belief system in the medical
sphere than it is in decisions regarding occupation or procreation. After
all, the right to bodily integrity is basic to self-determination. That right is
threatened when individuals are not given the opportunity to make fully
informed decisions to participate in experimental medical treatment. If we
believe that every human being is a morally autonomous decision maker,
then we must encourage other nations with which we develop international
standards to recognize the primacy of self-determination in medical
research.
